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Information Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking,
and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis
by Michael Abramowicz∗
FutureMAP, a project of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, was to
involve experiments to determine whether information markets could improve
Defense Department decisionmaking. Information markets are securities markets
used to derive information from the prices of securities whose liquidation values are
contingent on future events. The government intended to use such a market to assess
the probabilities of potential political assassinations, and the indelicacy of this
potential application contributed to a controversy leading to the cancellation of the
program. In this Article, Professor Abramowicz assesses whether information
markets in theory could be useful to administrative agencies, and it concludes that
information markets could help discipline administrative agency predictions, but only
if a number of technical hurdles such as the danger of manipulation can be overcome.
Because the predictions of well-functioning information markets are objective, they
function as a tool that exhibits many of the same virtues in predictive tasks that costbenefit analysis offers for normative policy evaluation. Both approaches can help to
overcome cognitive errors, thwart interest group manipulation, and discipline
administrative agency decisionmaking. The Article suggests that the two forms of
analysis might be combined to produce a “predictive cost-benefit analysis.” In such
an analysis, an information market would predict the outcome of a retrospective costbenefit analysis, to be conducted some years after the decision whether to enact a
particular policy. As long as the identity of the eventual decisionmaker cannot be
anticipated, predictive cost-benefit analysis estimates how an average decisionmaker
would be expected to evaluate the policy. Because the predictive cost-benefit analysis
assessment is not dependent on the identity of current agency officials, they cannot
shade the numbers to justify policies that the officials prefer for idiosyncratic or
ideological reasons.
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INTRODUCTION
Administrative law innovations are not ordinarily announced on the front page of the
New York Times. A Defense Department experiment in government decisionmaking, however,
made the front page of the Times two days in a row. The first article announced the plan for the
program, 1 and the second announced that officials had responded to criticisms of it by
withdrawing it even before it was to be launched later that week.2 The program, sponsored by the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, was to have been called FutureMAP, and its goal
was to develop “market-based techniques for avoiding surprise and predicting future events.”3
The immediate application that generated controversy was the use of an information market to
predict developments in the Middle East, including terrorist acts. One senator denounced the
program as a “federal betting parlor on atrocities.”4 Participants in information markets in effect
place bets on future events, so the description is not an inaccurate one.

1

See Carl Hulse, Pentagon Prepares a Futures Market on Terror Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2003, at A1.
See Carl Hulse, Swiftly, Plan for Terrorism Futures Market Slips into Dustbin of Ideas Without a Future, N.Y. TIMES, July 29,
2003, at A1 (A10 in later editions).
3
http://www.darpa.mil/iao/FutureMAP.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2003) (web site no longer available). FutureMAP is an acronym
for “Futures Markets Applied to Prediction.”
4
Ken Guggenheim, Pentagon Says Threat-Bet Program To Be Canceled, AP, July 29, 2003(quoting Sen. Ron Wyden).
2

2

The firestorm over FutureMAP mostly reflected its implications for anti-terrorism efforts.
Concerns included that FutureMAP actually might encourage terrorism, 5 and politicians
reasonably worried that federally sponsored wagering on whether foreign leaders might be
assassinated could damage foreign relations.6 Yet there was virtually no discussion in the media
of the relevance of information markets themselves for governmental decisionmaking. 7
Policymaking by governmental agencies often depends, either implicitly or explicitly, on
predictions about the future. Economic policy depends on anticipation of economic conditions.
Decisions whether to build prisons depend on projections of the number of prisoners. Highway
appropriations depend on anticipated traffic. And on and on. Even where prediction is not central
to determining whether there is a need for government action, an agency decision to enact any
regulation presumably depends at least on a prediction that the regulation will have certain
consequences. Predictions both about conditions that might affect government policy and about
the consequences of such policy are thus central to regulation.
Despite the central of prediction to policymaking, there is no provision in the
Administrative Procedure Act specifying how agencies should go about making predictions, and
so predictions in effect are treated like any other agency findings. 8 If FutureMAP had any
promise, it was not so much as an anti-terrorism tool, but as a method for systematizing
administrative agency predictions, a method that might be useful in other regulatory areas even if
not for terrorism. The FutureMAP debacle has provided a setback, maybe a permanent one, to
anyone who might have hoped to use information markets in administrative decisionmaking. The
academic question remains, however, of whether information markets would be a useful tool for
government agencies to employ. That is the question this Article considers, and the answer it
provides is mixed. Information markets could help constrain administrative decisionmaking and

5

Id. (quoting Sen. Thomas Daschle as providing “an incentive actually to commit acts of terrorism”).
Hulse, supra note 1 (quoting Sen. Byron Dorgan as rhetorically asking, “Can you imagine if another country set up a betting
parlor so that people could go in . . . and bet on the assassination of an American political figure?”).
7
For two exceptions, see Daniel Gross, Book-Makers for the Bomb-Makers, SLATE, July 29, 2003, available at
http://slate.msn.com/id/2086315/; and Jeremy Kahn, Is A Futures Market on Terror Outlandish?, FORTUNE, July 30, 2003,
available at http://www.fortune.com/fortune/investing/articles/0,15114,471785,00.html. These articles, however, focus on the
mechanics of information markets, not on whether information markets might be useful in government decisionmaking generally.
8
There is some uncertainty in the case law about whether predictions should be treated as fact findings, and thus subject to the
substantial evidence test, or as policy decisions, and thus subject to hard look review. Compare, e.g., American Textile Mfrs.
Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“OSHA’s prediction of the cost of the Cotton Dust
Standard lacks a basis in substantial evidence.”), with Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 373-74 (1989)
(noting that the agency is required to take a “hard look” at the environmental effects of its action).
6
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limit ideological decisionmaking, but their usefulness depends on some difficult empirical
questions that the economics literature on information markets has not yet adequately answered.
The phrase “information market” evokes the mechanics of the approach and highlights
the intuition underlying it. An information market, as traditionally constructed, is a stock market
created for the purpose of extrapolating information from share prices. The securities in such a
market do not serve as claims to corporate ownership, but rather offer payoffs contingent on
some future contingency specified by the market’s sponsor. A security in an antiterrorism
program, for example, might be issued with the proviso that its face value will be paid if and
only if a cyberterrorism attack succeeds in shutting down the New York Stock Exchange in the
next year. By examining the price at which the security is traded, the Defense Department would
be able to obtain an estimate of this risk.9 Although some firms might use such a market as a
means of hedging risk,10 its primary purpose is to harness the power of securities markets to
aggregate information. An information market is potentially useful whenever an agency decision
depends in part on information about the future and a security can be constructed whose price
would provide a relevant prediction.
The word “market,” however, can be misleading. Information markets need not depend
on either trading or the issuance of securities at all, and indeed this Article will endorse an
approach that does not rely on buying or selling.11 Broadly conceived, an information market is
any device that gives third parties financial incentives to make predictions or to improve upon
the others’ predictions and that combines the predictions into a single consensus value. The
literature suggesting that conventional stock markets exhibit at least a weak form of market
efficiency12 does not itself guarantee comparable performance levels in all information markets,
9

Presumably, such information would have been useful so that the Department of Defense might take action to prevent an attack.
The example, however, immediately presents an obvious problem with this particular implementation of information markets. A
trader with information that a cyberterrorism attack is likely would have no incentive to trade on the information if such trading
would succeed in thwarting the attack. See infra Part II.B.1.
10
The securities in information markets are derivatives, but because securities will exist only for a small subset of all risks, the
introduction of these derivatives may not necessarily enhance welfare, placing aside the use of these securities for informational
purposes. See Peter H. Huang, Securities Price Risks and Financial Derivative Markets, 21 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 589 (2001)
(explaining why the introduction of a new derivative market has indeterminate consequences for consumer and investor welfare).
11
See infra Part I.C.2 (discussing the “market scoring rule”).
12
For a discussion of the three possible levels of market efficiency, see Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of
Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970). Some finance scholars have found deviations from semi-strong form
efficiency. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 626 n.205
(1984). There has long been a consensus, however, that markets exhibit at least weak-form efficiency, meaning that future price
movements cannot be predicted solely on the basis of past prices. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance,
Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1081 (1990) (noting “overwhelming
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and similarly the behavioral finance literature identifying irrationalities in aggregate stock
market investment is of little applicability, at least to the information market form endorsed
here.13 A small economics literature on information markets, however, has offered preliminary
assessments of the accuracy of information markets, 14 considering such existing information
markets as the Iowa Electronic Markets,15 which primarily allow for trading on the elections’
outcomes. These studies indicate that information markets are generally superior to other
forecasting tools, such as polls, because information markets aggregate a variety of types of
information and a range of individuals’ predictions.16
There has been no legal scholarship on information markets’ potential uses to aggregate
information for administrative decisionmaking.17 This aggregation function alone could make
information markets a modestly useful tool in administrative decisionmaking, perhaps providing
a small advantage over relying on a single expert to combine various information sources. There
is, however, an additional attribute of information markets, receiving little attention in the
economics literature, 18 that is of far greater significance for governmental decisionmaking.
empirical support for weak-form efficiency See generally Michael L. Wachter, Takeover Defense When Financial Markets Are
(Only) Relatively Efficient, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 787, 801-04 (2003) (providing a recent review of the market efficiency literature).
13
For a review of the literature, see Andrei Shleifer, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000).
Behavioral finance scholars worry less about the relative valuations of securities than about aggregate investment. See, e.g.,
Jeeman Jung & Robert Shiller, ONE SIMPLE TEST OF SAMUELSON’S DICTUM FOR THE U.S. STOCK MARKET (NBER Working Paper
No. 9348, Nov. 2002) (providing a test confirming the prediction that capital markets are more efficient for individual stocks than
for the aggregate stock market). Paul Samuelson made this point as follows:
Modern markets show considerable micro efficiency (for the reason that the minority who spot aberrations from micro
efficiency can make money from those occurrences and, in doing so, they tend to wipe out any persistent
inefficiencies). In no contradiction to the previous sentence, I had hypothesized considerable macro inefficiency, in the
sense of long waves in the time series of aggregate indexes of security prices below and above various definitions of
fundamental values.
Letter from Paul Samuelson to John Campbell and Robert Shiller, quoted in ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 243
(2d ed. 2001). Aggregate investment is not a concern with information markets constructed in the manner that this Article
recommends. Participants’ sole incentive with this approach is to offer the best predictions possible, so while increased
participation in a market should enhance accuracy, unlike conventional markets, there are no securities whose prices will be bid
up as a result of increased investment.
14
See infra Part I.B. The literature is small, but the Defense Department’s program has triggered some interest among
economists, many of whom gave presentations at a DARPA-sponsored June 2002 workshop on information markets. See
http://marteksys.com/martek/DARPAConference.html (last visited June 17, 2003) (conference announcement).
15
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/ (last visited June 17, 2003).
16
For an article describing how information markets aggregate information, see David M. Pennock & Michael P. Wellman, A
Market Framework for Pooling Opinions (2001) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/399182.html).
17
FutureMAP has received far less media attention than the Information Awareness Office’s data mining program. Media
references include DARPA Continues Efforts to Develop Future-Forecasting Markets, INSIDE AIR FORCE, Jan. 6, 2003, available
at 2003 WL 7601951; Shane Kite, Project Seeks Terror Clues in Marts, SEC. INDUS. NEWS, Mar. 17, 2003, available at 2003 WL
7547217; and James Surowiecki, Decisions, Decisions, NEW YORKER, Mar. 24, 2003 (mentioning FutureMAP in a brief article
on information markets).
18
At least one commentator has mentioned potential usefulness in controlling bias. See George R. Neumann, Using Markets to
Make Decisions at slide 2 (2002) (unpublished presentation, on file with author) (noting the possibility of “’yes’-man effect in
organizations” or “institutional biases”). also underlie one of the first papers to consider information markets, which considered
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Information markets provide objective predictions, though only if concerns such as the
possibility of market manipulation can be overcome. Even if information markets offered little in
the way of improved accuracy relative to a single, well-motivated decisionmaker’s prediction,
the objectivity of well-functioning information markets makes them a promising potential
administrative decisionmaking tool. Agencies that regularly utilized information markets might
limit the influences of interest group pressure, availability cascades,19 and related pathologies of
bureaucratic life. Information markets thus help discipline agency predictions in much the same
way as cost-benefit analysis disciplines normative agency decisionmaking. 20 The results of
information markets could be useful, though not dispositive, in judicial review of agency action,
either as an agency uses the information market’s result to defend a challenged decision or as an
opponent of the agency action challenges the decision in court.
The objectivity of information markets, assuming that they could be made to function as
proposed, might appear to be both their greatest limitation as well as their greatest virtue in
governmental decisionmaking. The most difficult challenge for administrative agencies, after all,
is generally not the prediction of the future, but the evaluation of what should be done given such
predictions. As described in the existing literature, information markets serve to provide data
inputs into policy analysis, not to resolve a normative inquiry that may depend on a number of
variables. Information markets emerge in the literature as predictive tools analyzing objectively
verifiable facts about the world.21 The identity of the decisionmaker who announces the final
value from which traders’ profits are calculated thus has little or no relevance. An information

possible use as an alternative to peer review in science. See Robin D. Hanson, Could Gambling Save Science? Encouraging an
Honest Consensus, 9 SOC. EPISTEMOLOGY 3 (1995). No commentator to my knowledge, however, has considered the potential for
decision markets to overcome the problems frequently identified with governmental decisionmaking.
19
See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 683 (1999) (defining
an “availability cascade” as “a self-reinforcing process of collective belief formation by which an expressed perception triggers a
chain reaction that gives the perception increasing plausibility through its rising availability in public discourse”).
20
See infra Part II.A.1.
21
Actual markets recognize the possibility that there might be debate about the value of a number being predicted. See, e.g.,
http://www.ideosphere.com/fx-bin/Claim?claim=Clone (last visited June 17, 2003) (recognizing the possibility of ambiguity in a
claim being used to predict the possibility that a human clone will exist by 2005). I have found no existing information market
that attempts to predict or largely subjective decision. Nor have I found any articles suggesting that information markets be used
in this way. To the contrary, the literature on information markets seems to emphasize that the variable being predicted be
capable of objective measurement. Robin Hanson, for example, discusses an information market assessing a criminal justice
policy, “[Y]ou must state your claim clearly…. You might decide to focus on your state’s murder rate, using some standard
government statistic M as your official measure of it.” Robin Hanson, Decision Markets, IEEE INTELLIGENT SYS., May/June
1999, at 16, 17. In a discussion, however, Hanson readily acknowledged that as long as there was a clear means of identifying the
eventual decision, a market could evaluate the eventual subjective decision and that any bias in decision would not affect the
market prediction to the extent that it was known ex ante.
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market, however, could be easily used to make predictions about future normative assessments
of legal policy, even if these normative assessments are wholly subjective. There must be some
procedure for determining who will make the future subjective assessment, so in a sense any
normative assessment that resolves an information market is in itself an objectively verifiable
fact. Such a market, however, would predict what someone will say about the relevant issue
rather than directly predicting some number on which all decisionmakers should be expected,
more or less, to agree.
This Article’s principal contribution is to defend the proposition that markets of this type,
which I will call normative information markets, may be particularly useful, and indeed that they
have significant advantages in legal decisionmaking over information market types that the
literature previously envisioned, which I will label positive information markets. The literature’s
failure to discuss normative information markets is understandable. Opinions, after all, are
inherently subjective, and it might appear that there is no point in making objective predictions
of subjective assessments. This response, however, ignores that whether policies are ultimately
enacted depends on subjective assessments of whether those policies are desirable, and
normative information markets can reveal how decisionmakers on average, rather than just
particular agency bureaucrats, would assess policies. While positive information markets can
provide data that may serve as useful inputs into a policy decision, a normative information
market can provide a bottom-line assessment of the policy itself. Normative information markets
are thus easier to interpret and avoid some of the technical problems that may beset positive
information markets.22
For an example of how a prediction of a subjective assessment could be useful, imagine a
very primitive normative information market used to predict whether ten years from now an
agency official will conclude that a set of safety regulations being considered today are “good”
or “bad.” If each market security would pay $1 if the final evaluation is that the regulations are
judged as good, then a trading price of thirty cents would reflect an objective market prediction
that there is a thirty-percent chance that the eventual decisionmaker will also conclude that the
decision was good. Such a prediction, if made before the decision,23 would serve as a reality
22

See infra Part III.B.1.
A complication here is how to liquidate the market if the agency in fact decides not to make the decision. There are at least two
possibilities. First, the rules might provide that all investments will be refunded at cost if the decision is not made. This approach
23
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check that might help avoid decisions that seem superficially attractive but that on closer analysis
seem likely to prove misguided over time. At the same time, this information market type might
assist in exposing an agency, or agency decisionmaker, acting on impermissible or socially
inefficient motivations,24 in a way that a market reporting only one input into an agency decision
cannot, given the agency’s ability in many cases to justify decisions on the basis of other, not
easily measured factors. Of equal significance, a market prediction indicating that there is a
seventy-percent possibility of a “good” assessment might help an agency to defend farsighted
actions against superficial attacks.
The prediction of a normative information market, however, may not be all that
meaningful if the decisionmaker who will perform the eventual policy assessment is known in
advance. The market would be considerably more useful if the eventual decisionmaker were
unknown, because the market prediction would then reflect an expectation of what an average
decisionmaker would decide. An information market that predicts a future retrospective
evaluation of a decision allows for a normative policy analysis that is not influenced by the party
affiliation or ideology of current agency decisionmakers. Thus, even if the eventual evaluation is
partly or completely subjective, an information market can furnish a relatively objective datum
on how the average person would be expected to make that subjective, retrospective assessment.
Although a hypothetical average decisionmaker is not identical to the heuristic median voter
commonly identified in political science literature, 25 the concepts are similar. An agency’s
announced intent to enact regulations does not, by itself, indicate whether policymakers would
generally share the agency’s assessment of the issue or whether the agency is driven by
idiosyncratic factors. A normative information market can provide an objective assessment of
whether policymakers in general would reach the same conclusion as the agency.
leads to a potential selection bias problem, however. See infra paragraph accompanying note 75. Second, the rules might provide
for a retrospective assessment regardless of whether the safety regulations are in fact enacted. See infra Part III.A (describing a
similar approach).
24
For example, an agency might be motivated by a desire to help a particular well-connected group or corporation but deny such
a motivation. If traders assume that the future retrospective decisionmakers allegiance is unknown, then they may predict a
negative evaluation if the factors that the agency uses to justify its policy decision do not themselves seem persuasive.
25
Whether a political system should aspire to enshrine the preferences of the median voter is more complicated. As Robert
Cooter notes, there may be a tradeoff between institutions that produce policies appealing to the median voter and those that
allow bargaining to reflect intensity of preferences. See Robert Cooter, Constitutional Consequentialism: Bargain Democracy
Versus Median Democracy, 3 THEORETICAL INQ. IN LAW 1 (2002). Because the primitive information market described here
assesses whether a majority of decisionmakers would approve of regulations, it will tend to produce policies of which the median
voter would approve, assuming that the decisionmakers are representative. Predictive cost-benefit analysis, described below, does
not allow for explicit bargaining, but it does register the intensity of preferences.
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The primitive normative market described so far, while producing useful data, is flawed,
because it does not take into account predictions about either how good or bad a decision is
likely to be. If, for example, there were a forty percent chance that a decision would have
disastrous consequences and a sixty percent chance that a decision would have modest benefits,
the information market described so far would produce an incomplete and misleading
assessment. One way to take into account the magnitude of effects, as well as the intensity of
preferences, would be to combine an information market with the tool that agencies often use to
perform normative policy evaluations: cost-benefit analysis. This Article thus imagines
predictive cost-benefit analysis, an information market used to predict a cost-benefit analysis that
would be performed some time after a decision whether to enact a policy. Such a market would
produce an objective prediction of an eventual subjective evaluation. The purpose of the eventual
cost-benefit analysis that the information market predicts would not be to make a decision, but
rather solely to discipline the cost-benefit analysis produced by the information market.
As long as the actual cost-benefit analysis is performed sufficiently in the future that
traders would be unable to predict the political parties and ideologies of those who will perform
it, predictive cost-benefit analysis is not vulnerable to the principal critiques made of the more
familiar form of cost-benefit analysis. First, because information markets are objective, an
agency cannot manipulate predictive cost-benefit analysis as an ad hoc rationale for decisions
that the administrative agency would have made anyway.26 Second, the cost-benefit analyses that
the information market predicts could be relatively flexible. Some proponents of cost-benefit
analysis have argued that such analysis must proceed according to relatively clear rules to
prevent manipulation.27 The problem with rigid cost-benefit analysis is that it necessarily makes
value choices, whether by setting particular values for variables or by declaring certain types of

26

See, e.g., Staff of Subcomm. On Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess., Cost-Benefit Analysis: Wonder Tool or Mirage? 5 (Comm. Print 1980) (arguing that agency officials manipulate
cost-benefit analyses to suit their policy preferences); Thomas O. McGarity, Professor Sunstein’s Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO. L.J. 2341,
2366 (2002) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis entails “frequently preposterous and always manipulable number spinning”);
Christopher H. Schroeder, In the Regulation of Manmade Carcinogens, if Feasibility Analysis Is the Answer, What Is the
Question?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1494 (1990) (“Cost-benefit analysis has been frequently faulted for requiring data that is,
practically speaking, often unavailable and that, when available at all, is subject to manipulation by industry interests.”); Steve
Bennett, Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Feasibility Requirement of the Occupational Noise Regulation, 55 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 123, 146 (1986) (rejecting applicability of cost-benefit analysis to a particular regulation on manipulability grounds).
27
See, e.g., Steve P. Calandrillo, Responsible Regulation: A Sensible Cost-Benefit, Risk Versus Risk Approach to Federal Health
and Safety Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 957, 998-1000 (2001) (urging use of objective data and providing an anecdotal example
of how subjectivity may adversely affect risk calculations); see also infra notes 290-298 and accompanying text.
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noneconomic considerations irrelevant. 28 The result is that such cost-benefit analysis can be
justified only to those who agree with the rules governing it. If agencies can no longer use costbenefit analysis to rationalize decisions, then manipulation is no longer a danger, and rigid rules
are no longer necessary. Predictive cost-benefit analysis would reflect the values that average
decisionmakers would set for variables about which there is substantial controversy, including
discount rates,29 the value of a statistical life,30 and the benefit that citizens receive from the
existence of species, clean air, and the like.31 Similarly, it would allow incorporation of effects,
such as distributive consequences, that are typically ignored. In sum, predictive cost-benefit
analysis overcomes the tradeoff generally associated with conventional cost-benefit analysis
between the dual goals of constraining agencies and allowing cost-benefit analysis to be
relatively inclusive.
This Article seeks both to identify information markets’ potential technical problems
with, and to consider information markets’ potential usefulness assuming that these potential
problems either do not exist or can be overcome. Part I offers a critical introduction to
information markets. In addition to describing existing implementations and proposals for
information market design, this Part considers information markets’ accuracy. One of the most
intriguing implementations of information markets is a conditional market, which is used to
predict how a decision might affect some variable of interest. This Part, however, explains that
the results of conditional markets must be cautiously interpreted, because variance attributable to
slight imperfections in market design might appear to represent market predictions of the effect
of the decisions at issue. The part also describes how problems associated with thin information
markets can be overcome, and how a sponsor might subsidize an information market to improve
participants’ incentives to engage in research and analysis.
28

Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 1553, 1576 (2002) (“Because value-laden premises permeate cost-benefit analysis, the claim that cost-benefit analysis
offers an ‘objective’ way to make government decisions is simply bogus.”).
29
See, e.g., John J. Donohue III, Why We Should Discount the Views of Those Who Discount Discounting, 108 YALE L.J. 1901
(1999); Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the
Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 267 (1993); Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Our Future, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 39 (1999);
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
941 (1999).
30
For a recent work on improving valuations of statistical lives by the most influential commentator in this area, see W. Kip
Viscusi, The Value of Life: Estimates with Risks by Occupation and Industry (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. For Law, Econ., and
Bus. Discussion Paper No. 422, May 2003).
31
See generally Donald J. Boudreaux et al., Talk Is Cheap: The Existence Value Fallacy, 29 ENVTL. L. 765 (1999) (providing an
overview of methods for calculating existence value and arguing that the notion of existence value is conceptually flawed).
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Part II discusses information markets’ uses in administrative decisionmaking. The
administrative markets’ principal virtue is their objectivity, and this part begins by explaining
how an objective prediction tool could help overcome various problems of administrative
decisionmaking. It then presents both the affirmative case that information markets are relatively
objective and two concerns regarding their objectivity. The concerns are that interested parties
might manipulate them, and that the market participants’ unrepresentativeness might affect
market results. There are some theoretical reasons to think that these dangers are small, but
attempts at manipulation might foster suspicions and decrease market accuracy. This Part
describes how a novel two-phase information market design might alleviate this concern and
encourage information sharing among market participants. With any market design, however, the
impact of manipulation and unrepresentativeness are ultimately empirical, and this Part also
explains how experiments might assess the extent of these problems. Part II then describes
various possible uses of information markets—some modest, others less so—and evaluates how
the various technical challenges in information market design might affect these uses.
Finally, Part III describes and defends predictive cost-benefit analysis. Because predictive
cost-benefit analysis can result in a policy assessment regardless of the original decision, it does
not suffer from selection bias and other technical problems that make conditional markets
difficult to interpret. This part also explains that although predictive cost-benefit analysis itself
may be more costly than traditional cost-benefit analysis, it offers significant benefits over the
traditional approach. Predictive cost-benefit analysis is more objective than traditional costbenefit analysis, and it thus provides a more reliable signal about the policies that an agency
wishes to undertake. Indeed, this form of cost-benefit analysis potentially could satisfy both
camps in various debates on regulatory theory. Part III also considers an alternative means of
structuring information markets making predictions of subjective evaluations for situations in
which it is particularly difficult or problematic to reduce cost or benefit assessments to dollar
terms.
I.

THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION MARKETS

Part I.A explains the mechanics of simple information markets, and Part I.B reviews the
limited literature assessing the accuracy of existing markets. Part I.C considers alternative means
of structuring information markets to address particular challenges, identifying problems with
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“conditional markets” used to assess the effects of a possible policy and explaining how
information markets can be constructed when thin trading is anticipated and when the
government wishes to subsidize participation to ensure greater accuracy.
A. The Mechanics
A basic information market’s operation is simple. The information market’s sponsor
issues one or more securities and provides some form of prospectus specifying how each security
will eventually be redeemed. Each security’s payout will be some function of a number or
numbers that will become objectively verifiable by the time of redemption. The sponsor sells
securities to those who wish to participate in the market, and participants subsequently can trade
securities with one another. Typically, a market maker will match those wishing to buy and sell a
particular security, for example facilitating a transaction when someone is willing to buy at a
price greater than or equal to the price at which someone else is willing to sell, which is when the
largest bid price is greater than or equal to the largest ask price.32 The prices at which these
transactions occur, as well as the bid and ask prices, reflect market predictions of the eventual
payout, and thus of the number of numbers on which that payout is based.
The Iowa Electronic Markets, the only legal, continuously operating information markets
using real money,33 offer numerous examples. Most of the information markets operated by the
Iowa Electronic Markets involve predictions of the results of political elections,34 although a few
nonpolitical markets also exist.35 The election markets are of two types: vote-share markets and
winner-take-all markets. In a vote-share market, a security corresponds to a particular candidate
or political party and pays off the number of cents equal to the percentage of votes obtained. For
example, each security corresponding to a candidate who wins thirty percent of the total votes

32

Bid-ask spreads will be relatively large when there is a relatively large possibility that traders will have asymmetric
information, such as in markets in which insider trading is possible. See James Harlan Koenig, The Basics of Disclosure: The
Market for Information in the Market for Corporate Control, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1021, 1030 n.47 (1989).
33
Certain Internet gambling sites have created illegal information markets based on the results of sporting events. See, e.g.,
http://www.tradesports.com (last visited June 17, 2003) (providing information market services from Ireland). The Iowa
Electronic Markets, by contrast, have received regulatory clearance for their activities. See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
Other real-money information markets are planned. See, e.g., http://www.simonmarket.org (last visited June 17, 2003) (planning
to offer an information market for claims about science).
34
See http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/archive/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2003) (providing an archive of closed markets and historical
data).
35
For example, a current market predicts interest rates set by the Federal Reserve Board. See
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/markets/fedpolicyb.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2003).
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would pay $0.30. In a winner-take-all market, a security corresponding to a candidate or party
pays off if and only if that candidate or party receives the most votes in the election.
Consider, for example, Figure 1, which reports the last share price for securities in the
vote-share market for the 2000 Presidential election. The graph is relatively stable, with both the
Democratic and Republican expected vote shares hovering near fifty percent. The data, however,
shows some variation. For example, as Democratic nominee Al Gore gained in the polls in early
September his vote share also rose, but by late October, Republican nominee George W. Bush
had a slight edge. The contracts eventually paid off at virtually identical prices, with Democratic
securities paying at $0.499, Republican securities paying at $0.497, and Reform securities paying
at $0.004, all calculated based on the vote totals and shares reporting on November 10, 2000, in
the New York Times and the Washington Post.36

Figure 1: The 2000 Presidential Election Vote Shares Market
This graph indicates the last price at which the securities in the Iowa Electronic Markets’ 2002 Presidential election
vote shares market were traded on each day from May 1 to November 10.
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See Dan Balz, Resolution Days Away as Bush’s Lead Shrinks in Fla., WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2000, at A1 (reporting that Gore
led in the popular vote by 49,059,936 to 48.858,335). The market defined vote shares as the vote shares among the three parties,
so any votes received by other parties did not count. An alternative approach would have been to have an “other” security,
representing the vote share of all parties other than those explicitly represented by securities.
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For the most part, this chart provides a tentative indication that vote shares markets
provide at least roughly rational predictions. Changes in the candidates’ fortunes, as indicated by
news reports and polls, seem to be reflected in the trading prices. Market prices, moreover, are
far less volatile than conventional stock markets.37 Shares of companies sometimes seem to move
dramatically without explanation or at least disproportionately to the apparent significance of
new information,38 but this market’s predictions seem almost always be at least close to what
common sense would suggest. At least one anomaly is visible, however; the Democratic share
price has a one-time dramatic spike to 0.60 on August 3.39 This spike has no apparent reflection
in campaign information, and it tellingly is not mirrored by a concurrent fall in the Republican
share price. This price presumably only reflects the final transaction on August 3, and it may be
the product of a foolish or manipulative trader. The lesson is that in a relatively thin market, the
last price traded may reflect an anomaly, at least in the absence of a sufficiently sophisticated
automated market maker.40 If one were relying on the market predictions for practical purposes,
it might thus be advisable to ignore price spikes of very short duration and to consider
inframarginal bid and ask prices, or average transaction prices over a series of transactions, as
potentially better predictors than the share price of the last transaction.
Figure 2 presents the 2000 Presidential election winner-take-all market, and with it an
unexpected surprise: Gore wins. This victory in the Iowa Electronic Markets, however, conveys
no governmental power, as the prospectus for the election clearly defines the winner of the
winner-take-all market as the winner of the popular vote, as reported on November 10.41 That
37

Many of the causes of stock market volatility, such as economic uncertainty, seem unlikely to affect information markets. Cf.
Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Market Volatility: Causes and Consequences, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 953-54 (1989) (discussing the
causes of stock market volatility).
38
The 1987 stock market crash is a common example of volatility that did not appear to reflect any underlying changes in market
fundamentals. See id. at 954-56.
39
Another anomaly is less visible on the graph. The final trading prices of the securities on November 10 before the payout were
0.481 for Democratic, 0.004 for Reform, and 0.491 for Republican. This is slightly different from the ultimate payout, even
though it appeared on November 9 that Gore would win the popular vote. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Electoral College,
Unfair from Day One, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, at A23. This anomaly reinforces that in a market without much liquidity, very
small price differences based on actual sales may not mean anything. The bid-ask spread at the end of November 10 may have
been more sensible, but that information is unavailable.
40
See, e.g., Morris Mendelson & Junius W. Peake, Intermediaries’ or Investors’: Whose Market Is It Anyway?, 19 J. CORP. L.
443, 481-82 (1994) (discussing automated market makers). The mechanism by which trades are executed in the Iowa Electronic
Markets is described by Robert Forsythe et al. See Anatomy of an Experimental Political Stock Market, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 1142,
1145 (1992).
41
See http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/closed/pr_Pres00_WTA.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2003). The prospectus makes explicitly
clear, “Payoffs are NOT affected by … the outcome of the electoral college or any vote taken by the House of Representatives
should such vote be necessary.” Id.
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definition is perhaps unfortunate, as a market dependent on the political party of the individual
actually sworn in as President would have revealed the extent to which events like the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore42 surprised the market.43 The trends in this graph in any event
correspond to those in Figure 1, but the effects are magnified. This is precisely what one would
expect when polling numbers are relatively stable but the election is close. The slight lead that
Gore had in the polls in September corresponds to a relatively large disparity in the probability
that each candidate would win the popular vote, and similarly, although Bush had only a slight
lead in expected vote share, that lead seemed sufficiently stable that his chance of winning the
popular vote was above 70% shortly before the election. Of course, Bush ended up losing the
popular vote, but the fact that what is sometimes unlikely turns out to happen does not by itself
mean that the market’s prediction was wrong. At least, the market’s predictions seem to
correspond with third parties’ assessments of the likely result of the popular vote,44 and once it
became clear that Gore would win the popular vote, the price line did an about face.45

42

531 U.S. 98 (2000).
The decision may have been motivated by concern that the market produce an unambiguous winner. Suppose, for example,
that the House of Representatives had initially deadlocked and then as a compromise chosen an independent as the next President
or decided on joint rule by Bush and Gore. These possibilities are fanciful, but the market designers’ possible desire to avoid
these contingencies may reflect the notion that the markets will be most meaningful when they are entirely objective. See supra
note 21 and accompanying text.
44
See, e.g., Ronald Brownstein, Polls Show Victory Could Come Without Winning, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2000, at A1 (noting that
although Bush was winning in the polls, he might win the popular vote and yet lose the electoral college).
45
There is another anomaly in this graph, however. The last trading price of the Democratic share was slightly below 1.0, and the
last trading price of the Republican share was slightly above 0. At least by the end of November 10, the outcome should have
been entirely clear, since the prospectus defined the winner relative to the popular vote shares reported on November 10. This
again reinforces that in a market with relatively low liquidity, very slight deviations in the prices at which shares are traded may
not be meaningful. See supra note 39. Note that bid-ask prices presumably would be more so, given that any rational trader
would trade only at $0 or $1.
43
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Figure 2: The 2000 Presidential Election Winner-Take-All Market
This graph indicates the last price at which the securities in the Iowa Electronic Markets’ 2002 Presidential election
winner-take-all market were traded on each day from May 1 to November 10.

1
0.9

Democratic

0.8

Reform
Republican

0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1

10/30

10/16

10/2

9/18

9/4

8/21

8/7

7/24

7/10

6/26

6/12

5/29

5/15

5/1

0

One distinguishing feature of the Iowa Electronic Markets is that the values of all the
securities in any given market collectively add up to $1. This is convenient, because it allows for
an easy way to sell the securities. For each dollar that a participant pays, the participant initially
receives one of each security.46 This system ensures that the amount that the Iowa Electronic
Markets pays at liquidation is equal to the amount contributed. As a result, the Iowa Electronic
Markets avoids both the possibility of losing money and of gaining money, the latter of which
might make the markets appear to be more akin to a casino than a stock market. There is nothing
inherent about information markets, however, requiring security values to add up to a constant.
For example, one can imagine a market in which a security would be deemed worth one cent for
every million votes received by a particular candidate. Such a market would provide more
information than the vote shares market, predicting total turnout as well as the share of the vote
received by each security.47
46

See, e.g., http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/markets/pr_Pres04_VS.html (last visited June 17, 2003) (“Fixed-price bundles
consisting of one share of each of the contracts in this market can be purchased from or sold to the IEM system at any time. The
price of each bundle is $1.00.”).
47
A caveat is that prices in such a market might be affected by interest rates. If, for example, traders expected turnout of 50
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The Hollywood Stock Exchange is an information market structured along these lines,
although it uses only “fake money.” 48 The Exchange allows for trading on securities
corresponding to movies, including both those in production and those in theaters, with each
movie security liquidated four weeks after the movie release for $1 (well, one fake dollar) per $1
million in box office gross.49 Figure 3 provides an example. The Exchange also provides for
options trading, thus providing some additional information, although that information can be
difficult to decode. For example, if a call option50 to purchase a security at a strike price of $50
trades for $10, that price is roughly equal to the expected probability that the underlying security
will be worth at least $50 multiplied by the average expected price assuming it is worth at least
$50. That may give some information about the film’s upside potential, but the information is not
easy to digest. Only with a large number of options trading for different strike prices could one
obtain a full assessment of the probabilities corresponding to each possible level of the film’s
success.

million in an election a year away, they would only be willing to pay less than 50 cents for the security. There are several
potential solutions to this problem, however. For example, all transactions could be cleared at the time the market is liquidated,
regardless of when those transactions actually took place. Thus, if a participant made a purchase for fifty cents five months before
the market close, the fifty cents would be paid at the conclusion of the market.
48
See http://www.hsx.com (last visited Apr. 23, 2003).
49
See http://www.hsx.com/help/topics/whatcan.htm#1 (last visited Apr. 23, 2003). Similarly, the Exchange offers StarBonds,
corresponding to individual movie stars. These bonds are liquidated when a star’s career ends, whether by unnatural causes,
natural causes, or retirement, based on the average gross of the star’s previous five pictures. See id.
50
A call option is an option to purchase at a set price. See generally Kenneth A. Froot et al., A Framework for Risk Management,
72 HARV. BUS. REV. 91, 99 (1994) (providing an introduction to options).
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Figure 3: A Stock on the Hollywood Stock Exchange
This screen shot from the Hollywood Stock Exchange’s Internet site traces the price line of the stock corresponding to
51
the “Real Cancun.” The stock fell precipitously after an unexpectedly poor opening weekend.
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B. Accuracy
The 2000 Presidential election information markets alone provide some anecdotal
evidence about the accuracy of information markets. The winner-take-all market’s prediction on
election eve that Bush had a 70% chance of winning the popular vote, for example, seems to
roughly correspond to what we might have expected based on the evidence at the time. The price
seems to reflect a reasonable consensus, even though it would have been more impressive if the
market had predicted, against the apparent pre-election consensus, that Gore would win the
popular vote. Forsythe et al. provide a more complete analysis of the 1988 Iowa Electronic
Markets, showing how the market prediction of the candidates’ vote was more stable over the
course of the election than poll results.52 Perhaps more interesting, Forsythe et al. argue that poll
results did not drive market prices; that is, traders anticipated shifts in candidates’ fortunes as
reflected in polls before those polls actually occurred.53 The study thus suggests that information
markets are not simply crude aggregators of other predictors, but manage to effectively
incorporate difficult-to-interpret data. This conclusion should be treated with caution, however,

51

See, e.g., Leanne Potts, ‘Cancun’ Loses Its Shirt, ALBUQUERQUE J., May 2, 2003, at D1.
Forsythe et al., supra note 40, at 1150.
53
Id. at 1153 (“Evidently, traders were able to find out about the mood of the electorate without relying on opinion polls. In this
sense, polls are not ‘news’ to traders who have an incentive to seek out information from other sources.”).
52
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as a study of a similar market used to predict an election in the Netherlands reached a different
conclusion.54
It is only over a number of markets that information markets’ accuracy can be assessed.
Because information markets purport only to give the best guesses possible based on available
evidence, any single success or failure may reflect luck. Over a number of markets, however, it is
possible to measure information markets’ average performance.55 Berg et al., for example, have
considered all of the Iowa Electronic Markets’ vote share markets. 56 In the five vote-share
markets related to presidential elections, involving a total of twelve contracts, the markets had an
average absolute error of 1.37%, meaning that on average each election eve prediction was off
by 1.37%.57 In other U.S. elections, the average absolute error was 3.43%, largely because of two
primary elections in which the markets exhibited unjustified confidence in Paul Tsongas, and in
non-U.S. elections, the markets had an average absolute error of 2.12%.58 Collectively, these data
seem sufficient to establish that the markets’ predictions were neither haphazard nor perfectly
omniscient.59
The problem in assessing these data is the lack of a control group. A decisionmaker
without any alternative estimate of the relevant variable would benefit from considering an
information market prediction, but in real decision contexts, the choice is between relying on an
information market and relying on one or more experts. One experiment, involving Hewlett
Packard printer sales’ predictions, provides slight evidence supporting the hypothesis that
markets are better than experts.60 The market beat the official expert forecast six of eight times,61

54

Ben Jacobsen et al., (In)accuracy of a European Political Stock Market: The Influence of Common Value Structures, 44 EUR.
ECON. REV. 205, 216 (2000).
55
Formulas exist that make it possible to rate the accuracy of those who make repeated probability estimates, even though each
individual probability estimate admits some uncertainty. See, e.g., G.W. Brier, Verification of Forecasts Expressed in Terms of
Probability, 78 MONTHLY WEATHER REV. 1 (1950) (offering an early example of such a formula).
56
Joyce Berg et al., Results from a Dozen Years of Election Futures Markets Research (Nov. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
57
Id. app. at 1.
58
Id.
59
The mean average error for the securities in the Netherlands study was 3.1%, which was greater than the mean absolute errors
that had been reported up to that time, but still seems roughly consistent with this conclusion. See Jacobsen et al., supra note 54,
at 211. Jacobsen et al. also argue that a form of the winner’s curse led to overpricing of securities corresponding to parties with
relatively small shares of the vote. See id. at 224-27. If this explanation is accurate, it seems likely to endure, given the
opportunity that others would have to exploit this tendency once it is recognized.
60
See KAY-YUT CHEN & CHARLES R. PLOTT, INFORMATION AGGREGATION MECHANISMS: CONCEPT, DESIGN AND
IMPLEMENTATION FOR A SALES FORECASTING PROBLEM (Cal. Inst. of Tech. Social Science Working Paper No. 1131, 2002).
61
Id. at 20.
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even though the experts made their predictions after the markets closed. An analysis of the
Hollywood Stock Exchange, however, shows that an expert predictor of movie returns, Brandon
Gray of Box Office Mojo,62 slightly outperformed the market. 63 The average stock exchange had
an average percent error of 31.5%, while Box Office Mojo exhibited an error of only 27.5%.64
Even placing aside their conflicting results, these studies would be relatively
uninformative because the outcomes may depend on the setup of the particular experiment.
Perhaps Hewlett-Packard hired unusually bad forecasters to make the official prediction. Perhaps
Gray got lucky, or perhaps the Hollywood Stock Exchange’s imperfections can be traced to the
use of fake rather that real money. The ultimate question is whether experts or markets are likely
to outperform the other on average assuming that equal resources are provided for each task. It
would be possible to allocate some money amount either to hiring an expert or subsidizing an
information market.65 No set of even hypothetical experiments seems sufficient to provide a
definitive answer, or at least one in favor of information markets, given the impossibility of
finding an objectively superior process for hiring experts.
Perhaps the most that can be said on the basis of such experimental data is that
information markets and well-motivated experts are roughly comparable. In my judgment, this is
probably sufficient to justify further corporate as well as governmental experimentation with
information markets, but any ultimate benefit attributable to markets’ information aggregation
powers alone is likely to be relatively small. The more significant potential payoff from
information markets comes if there is reason to believe that some experts make systematic errors
or are not well-motivated. This is possible in some corporate contexts; perhaps an internal
market used to predict quarterly earnings would be less susceptible to optimism biases than more
traditional approaches. 66 It is in governmental decisionmaking, however, where there is the
greatest reason to be suspicious of experts, either because of external influence or because of
62

See http://boxofficemojo.com (last visited Apr. 28, 2003).
David M. Pennock et al., Extracting Collective Probabilistic Forecasts from Web Games, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH
ACM SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING (2001).
64
Id. at 4 tbl. 1.
63

65

See infra Part I.C.3 (discussing subsidizing markets).
Optimism biases sometimes lead individuals to believe that they are more likely than most to avoid risks such as that of
business failure. See, e.g., David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97 NW. L. REV. 1315,
1325 (2003) (“[P]eople may believe, even in the absence of any factual basis, that with time they will find a costless means to
avoid future risks.”); Barton H. Thompson, Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241,
264 (2000) (“[W]hen confronted by an uncertain future, most people assume that they will be able to avoid, reduce, ameliorate
future risks.”).
66
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ideological agendas. Information markets seem to have information aggregation capabilities that
are at least good enough for government work. The question, to which I shall return below,67 is
whether information markets are indeed objective, and whether a tool that allows the government
to make objective forecasts would be useful in governmental decisionmaking.
C. Market Design Challenges
1. Conditional Markets
Perhaps the most ambitious information market form proposed by economists to date is a
conditional market,68 which assesses the results of different choices that a decisionmaker might
make. Such a market harnesses information about the anticipated effects of a decision on some
number of interest to the market participants. Berg and Rietz have used a version of the Iowa
Electronic Markets in the 1996 Presidential election campaign to demonstrate the power of
information markets to assess conditional probabilities.69 The securities in the vote share market
included two securities for each potential Republican nominee conditional on that nominee’s
receiving the nomination. For example, one security represented the percentage of votes that
Robert Dole would receive in the general election, while another represented the percentage of
votes that the Democratic candidate would receive against Dole. At any time before the
nomination, the sum of these two securities would have reflected the market’s estimate of the
probability that Dole would win the nomination. The relative values of these shares would
indicate Dole’s projected performance relative to Clinton assuming that Dole was the nominee.
Berg and Rietz note that Republicans could have used the market prices to recognize that Dole
was not the strongest possible candidate against Clinton.70 The same conditional market approach
is being used for the 2004 Presidential election, and Table 1 shows a snapshot of market prices
and what those prices indicated about the market’s evaluation of candidates’ relative prospects.

67

See infra Part II.A.2.
See, e.g., Robin Hanson, Conditional Markets (2002) (unpublished presentation, on file with author) (providing a careful
analysis of such markets).
69
See Joyce A. Berg & Thomas A. Rietz, Prediction Markets as Decision Support Systems, 5 INFO. SYS. FRONTIERS 79 (2003).
70
This particular result may not have been all that surprising. Other commentators recognized Dole’s weakness at the time,
pointing to polling results involving hypothetical matchups between President Clinton and various Republican candidates. See
David S. Broder, Many Still Making Up Their Minds; Shifting Loyalties Mark Final Days, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1996, at A1. Of
course, some Republican voters might have preferred Dole over a candidate with a better chance of winning because they
preferred Dole enough to make it seem worth the risk.
68
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Table 4. The 2004 Presidential Election Conditional Vote Share Market
The table provides a snapshot of the 2004 Presidential Election market, as of April 28, 2003 at noon. The first column
lists each potential nominee, including one undeclared candidate (Hillary Clinton) and an “other” category, including
such potential nominees as John Edwards. Two securities correspond to each potential nominee. The two securities
corresponding to the eventual nominee will be liquidated based on the eventual two-party vote share in the election,
with all other contracts liquidating at zero. The third, fourth, and fifth columns report the bid and ask prices, followed
by the midpoint of these. The last two columns calculate the market’s estimate of the chance of the candidate’s
winning the election and the vote share assuming the candidate is nominated based on these midpoints. For
example, Hillary Clinton’s 0.058 chance of winning the nomination is the sum of the bid-ask midpoints (0.018 and
0.04) of the securities corresponding to her nomination. (Note that this measures her absolute chance of winning the
nomination, not her chance of winning conditional on deciding to run.) Clinton’s conditional vote share of 0.333 is
equal to her bid-ask midpoint divided by her overall chance of winning the election.

Potential
nominee
H. Clinton
R. Gephardt
J. Kerry
J. Lieberman
Other

Conditional security
for
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Republican

Bid
0.016
0.032
0.036
0.056
0.103
0.159
0.042
0.054
0.206
0.24

Ask
0.02
0.048
0.043
0.057
0.153
0.165
0.045
0.055
0.209
0.247

Midpoint
0.018
0.04
0.0395
0.0565
0.128
0.162
0.0435
0.0545
0.2075
0.2435

Chance of
winning
nomination

Conditional
vote share

0.058

0.333

0.096

0.391

0.29

0.393

0.098

0.438

0.451

0.462

The calculations in Table 1 are straightforward largely because the securities in the
conditional market are normalized so that the total payoffs are known, in this case one dollar.
This approach can be used to assess the extent to which a particular decision will affect some
other probability. Robin Hanson, for example, offers analysis of a hypothetical conditional
market used to determine how a decision whether to move troops will affect the probability that a
war will occur. 71 The market involves four securities. The first will pay off $1 if troops are
moved and there is a war; the second, if troops are moved and there is no war; the third, if the
troops are not moved and there is no war; the fourth, if troops are not moved and there is a war.
From the securities’ prices one could calculate both the market’s estimate of the chance that a
decision to move troops will be made and the market’s estimates of the correlation between a
decision to move troops and the probability that war will result from such a decision.
Hanson, however, also notes that conditional markets might be used to assess how
specified decisions might affect non-binary variables, such as stock price, GDP per capita, or

71

Hanson, supra note 68, at slides 2-3.
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unemployment rates.72 The mechanics here become somewhat more complicated. Suppose, for
example, that a conditional market is to be used to assess the effect of proposed airline safety
regulations on the number of people who will choose to fly on airplanes in a particular year,
because one anticipated effect of the regulations is increased consumer confidence. 73 The
government could issue a security that will pay off one cent per a specified number of passenger
miles if the regulations are adopted and another that will pay off at the same rate if the
regulations are not adopted. The values of these securities, however, would depend also on the
market’s prediction about whether the regulations are adopted. A simple solution would be to
create an additional information market estimating the probability that the agency will indeed
adopt the regulations, for example by issuing two securities, with one selected to pay off $1
depending on whether the regulations are adopted.74 The price of each security divided by the
probability of the corresponding decision would then provide a prediction of the passenger miles
in each scenario.
Information markets may produce misleading predictions, however, if there is a
possibility that the eventual decisionmaker might have information unavailable to the market.
Suppose that an airline safety market participant estimates, based on her own information, that
there will be 500 billion passenger miles if the regulations are adopted and 490 billion otherwise,
but the participant also knows that the decisionmaker has additional information that could allow
for refinement of these estimates and therefore might affect the eventual decision. The decision
itself thus might provide some indication of the content of this information. The market
participant should reason that if the regulations are enacted, then the probability that the
information is favorable to the regulations is higher than the participant’s initial estimate, and
vice versa if the regulations are rejected. As a result, the participant should price the security

72

Id. at slide 4.
Of course, a market equally could be used to measure the variable that is more obviously of interest, the number of anticipated
deaths in airplane crashes. I use the passenger miles to place aside questions about the appropriateness of using an information
market to predict deaths and about whether information markets might create a moral hazard problem by encouraging people to
predict high death totals and then cause those deaths. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
74
An alternative solution would be for the government to provide that the transactions on the irrelevant market would be
cancelled, with all investors in that market receiving refunds. For example, if the regulations were adopted, then the information
market corresponding to nonadoption would be cancelled. Such a market would give no indication of the probability of adoption
but would indicate the effect of adoption. A drawback of this approach is that if there is a very high probability of adoption or
nonadoption, there might be very little incentive to trade on the market that will be cancelled, and its results may thus be
unreliable. This may not be a large concern, however, since the very high probability would presumably indicate that the
government is not expected to take into account the market prediction in any event.
73
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conditional on enactment as above the 500 billion level, and the security conditional on rejection
as below that corresponding to 490 billion. Robin Hanson, who has recognized this potential
problem, suggests as a possible solution: to allow decisionmakers to trade, so that there will be
no information unavailable to the market. 75 This solution is problematic, however, because
decisionmakers might then be tempted to make decisions that would maximize their trading
gains rather than social welfare.
There are two additional reasons, besides this selection bias problem, suggesting
decisionmakers should hesitate before blithely accepting information market predictions
calculated on the basis of differences in security values. First, conditional markets may lead to
expenditure of effort on issues of little interest to the decisionmaker, as market participants may
factor in a number of variables besides whether a particular decision is made. In the market used
to predict the effect of proposed regulations on airline safety, for example, market participants
might devote considerable resources to the overall task of modeling passenger miles. If such a
market were subsidized,76 only a portion of the subsidy would go toward efforts focused on the
variable of interest, the effect of the regulations. If the regulations are expected to have a very
small effect on consumer behavior, few if any resources would be spent on this portion of the
analysis. There is no obvious way to determine how much effort market participants expended at
calculating the effect of the regulations. Any incomplete evaluation of relevant information in
effect adds noise to the estimate of interest.
Second, slight differences in security prices could be a result of a different type of noise.
If there is some noise in the data used to generate predictions, such as the last transaction price or
the midpoint of bid-ask spreads, then that noise may overwhelm the variable of interest. If the
increase in passenger miles caused by the regulation corresponds to a price effect that is smaller
than the bid-ask spread, for example, traders might have insufficient incentive to arbitrage away
any difference in price associated with the two securities. The greater the liquidity of the market,
the more closely market variables such as transaction price are likely to reflect the actual
consensus of market participants regarding the variables in question. As discussed below in more
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detail, 77 in a relatively thin market, there could be significant deviation between price and
consensus.
Each of these problems associated with conditional markets could have significant effects
on the calculation of the effect of the relevant decision on the variable of interest. The bias
attributable to this selection effect, for example, might be slight relative to the overall prediction
of passenger miles, but large relative to the predicted difference in passenger miles attributable to
a particular decision. If the bias leads to security prices corresponding to 485 and 505 billion
miles, for example, then the bias in effect doubles the conditional market’s estimate of the effect
of airline safety regulations. The resulting data might still be useful by showing that the
regulations will be expected to have only small effects. In some cases, this might itself be
sufficient the regulations should not be enacted, assuming that consumer confidence rather than
actual safety is the regulatory goal. But often in regulation, even relatively small effects matter,
and indeed an agency might consider effects on consumer confidence only because the issue is
close with respect to safety fundamentals. In that case, the government might want to know the
market’s exact prediction of number of lives saved by enacting the regulations.
In sum, while information markets in general can make predictions that may be used as
inputs in subsequent decisionmaking, conditional markets’ usefulness particularly stems from
their ability to predict the effect of hypothetical decisions on variables of interest. Slight
imperfections in information markets, however, are magnified when the predicted decision’s
effect can only be discerned by analyzing multiple market prices. Conditional markets are thus
most likely to be useful where the decision is expected to have a substantial effect on the
variables of interest. Often, though, conditional markets will not be useful in such a situation,
because when a decision is expected to have a significant effect, the direction of that effect is
likely to be known. These problems with conditional markets might thus suggest that it is not
possible to construct an information market that produces a useful evaluation of a potential
decision. I will argue in Part III, however, against this conclusion; predictive cost-benefit
analysis, while having some weaknesses relative to conditional markets, also succeeds in
avoiding many of their problems.
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2. Thin Markets
Information markets are a tool for generating consensus predictions from a number of
participants, but they may be less effective when markets are thin. In thin markets, trades occur
relatively rarely, and there is a danger that the most recent transaction will not represent the
market consensus. For example, even if all traders recognize that the value of the securities has
changed, they may have no reason to buy or sell these securities. The problem may be
particularly severe in an information market in which some traders may obtain significant
information that others lack. The greater the degree of information asymmetry, the larger bid-ask
spreads will be,78 and transactions will occur less frequently. The Iowa Electronic Markets seems
to have sufficient liquidity to enable frequent transactions, but even there, as indicated above, the
relative thinness of the market can make it hazardous to rely on the last transaction price.79 When
dealing with an information market in which there are fewer likely traders and asymmetric
information is more of a concern, however, the standard mechanism may prove more
problematic.
The central problem of thin information markets is that information markets rely on
voluntary transactions to assess market consensus, and under certain market conditions voluntary
transactions will not sufficiently occur. One can imagine many nonmarket mechanisms,
however, that allow compulsory transactions. Consider, for example, the following simple
mechanism: An initial predictor makes a prediction of the variable of interest.80 Anyone can
challenge the initial predictor to a bet, which the initial predictor is required to take. The
challenger then announces a new prediction and can be challenged in turn. So, if A predicts 5, B
could bet A that the amount will be higher and announce a new prediction of 8. Then, C could
bet B that the actual amount is 7. Suppose the market then closes and the amount turns out to be
6. If each unit of prediction corresponds to $1, then B would win $1 against A, but C would win
$1 against B. Such a simple betting scheme performs the same information aggregation function
as a securities market, but it encourages the predictors to update their predictions to reflect new
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information lest they be challenged, and it allows those with new information to trade on that
information even if others would prefer not to trade because of the informational asymmetry.
There are ways to integrate compulsory transactions into the market metaphor, for
example, enacting a rule that requires a security holder to announce a price which then serves as
an offer for anyone else to either buy the security at that price or sell an identical security to the
holder at that price.81 The central point, however, is that the market metaphor is unnecessary.
Information markets work because they allow market participants to profit when they correctly
identify that the consensus prediction is inaccurate. The market mechanism is both useful and
familiar, because we know that capital markets tend to aggregate predictions. The above
compulsory betting procedure, however, accomplishes much the same thing, and at least in one
respect, is better than the traditional capital market, because it allows participants to make
positive expected-value bets based on even small amounts of information. An additional virtue of
this procedure is that it helps distinguish information markets from more conventional securities
markets and the pathologies that behavioral finance scholars have identified within them.82 No
one would casually use this form of the information market as an investment vehicle, given the
risk of being subject to a bet.
Robin Hanson offers a similar proposal to overcome market thinness.83 Hanson builds on
the literature on “scoring rules,” which are rules that can be used to compensate individual
experts to induce honest valuations from them. For example, suppose that I wanted to give an
expert an incentive to estimate for me the average temperature this coming winter. I could ask
for an estimate and agree to pay the expert based on the difference between the prediction and
the eventual observed value, with a higher payment amount the closer the expert is. Modestly
more complicated scoring rules, the focus of the scoring rules literature, can be used to generate
predictions as to the probability of events.84 A scoring rule is similar to an information market in
that participants have an incentive to predict the events of interest to the sponsor. It is, in effect,
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an information market that could be used in the thinnest of all possible markets, a market with
just one participant.
Hanson suggests what he calls a “market scoring rule” as a way to provide a mechanism
that works like a scoring rule when there are only a small number of participants and like a more
traditionally structured information market when there are more participants. Under the market
scoring rule, after the initial prediction, anyone else can make a subsequent prediction, as long as
the subsequent predictor in effect agrees to pay off the current predictor when the market closes.
The subsequent predictor thus receives a payment equal to the difference in the payments that the
scoring rule would provide to the two predictors; if this number is negative, the subsequent
predictor would pay money.85 This system is identical to the betting scheme discussed above,
except that each subsequent predictor’s bet is with the house rather than with the previous
predictor. The advantage of this approach relative to the betting scheme described above is that a
potential predictor need only worry about coming up with a prediction that is likely to be better
than that of the current predictor, but need not worry that a subsequent predictor will further
refine his or her prediction. Given the risk, individuals might still choose not to act on very
minor pieces of information, but there will be more of an incentive to do so than with the betting
scheme.
3. Subsidized Markets
While the Iowa Electronic Markets are not subsidized, subsidies will improve market
participants’ incentives to engage in research and analysis, and further subsidies may be
necessary for markets that are less intrinsically interesting than the Iowa Electronic Markets.
Hanson’s market scoring rule provides an easy mechanism for subsidizing information markets.
Recall that after the initial predictor, each subsequent predictor receives a sum equal to the
amount by which the predictor achieved a better payout than her predecessor based on the
scoring rule. The sponsor of the market therefore will end up paying the difference between the
85
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amount that the scoring rule would indicate that the last predictor should receive and the amount
that the scoring rule would indicate that the first predictor should receive, and this difference is
the effective subsidy. There are two issues that the literature does not explicitly consider,
however. The first is how the first predictor would be selected. Being the first predictor would
provide a windfall, at least with any scoring rule that always produces a positive reward.86 The
second issue is how large a subsidy should be provided.
One approach would be for the sponsor to make an initial prediction of the variable of
interest. It could then announce a scoring rule that would produce a reward based on the amount
by which the eventual prediction improved upon this additional one (or a penalty if the eventual
prediction were further away). For example, in the airline safety regulation market described
above,87 the government might announce a prediction of 500 billion miles and then announce that
for each one billion improvement in predicting miles, the government would pay a total of
$1000. If the eventual prediction were 505 and the total number of miles turned out to be 510,
the government would pay a total of $5000.88
This does not identify a complete solution to the first problem identified above, the
selection of the first predictor. Rather, there still might be a windfall to the second predictor, and
thus a race to be that second predictor, if the initial market consensus is that the government’s
initial prediction was poor. A simple solution to this is to auction off the right to be the second
predictor.89 If the government announced a prediction of 490 billion miles, but it were widely
recognized even before research that 500 billion would be a more sensible initial estimate, then
the government would receive nearly $10,000 in auction revenues for the right to be the second
predictor, 90 and then would end up paying $10,000 back upon the close of the market. The
86
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incentives to improve on the prediction of 500 billion miles would exist as before, but the
windfall would be eliminated.
Regardless of whether an auction is used to eliminate windfalls, an advantage of a
subsidization scheme that provides a set reward for specified improvements in predictions is that
the sponsor of the market can set the subsidy based on its assessment of how valuable
improvements in the information would be. In this case, for example, potential participants will
invest their time and resources into market participation whenever they believe that an
investment of $1000 (including the risk associated with participation) will be expected to
produce a refinement in the estimate by one billion passenger miles. It is difficult to know how
valuable more accurate information is. Presumably, the subsidy should reflect the reliance the
government is likely to place on the information market; the higher the subsidy, the greater the
reliance the government is likely to place on the information market. This system has the virtue
of allowing the market sponsor to consider the information’s value directly, whereas other means
of providing subsidies may obscure the question of how much research the sponsor is
encouraging individuals to conduct. Despite this benefit, there may be occasions in which the
sponsor wishes to provide a set subsidy for a particular market, for example, because it needs to
be able to anticipate the cost of running the market. This would be a straightforward calculation,
as the subsidy, plus any auction revenues, 91 could be divided in proportion to the reward
indicated by the market scoring rule.92
II. INFORMATION MARKETS AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONMAKING

Information markets in theory might be used in any decisionmaking environment, and
corporations have experimented to determine how effectively information markets aggregate

uncertainty about the prediction being made. The predictor in effect would demand some compensation for this risk by bidding
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information. 93 If the information aggregation benefits are relatively modest, however, then it
might not seem worthwhile to experiment with information markets in governmental
decisionmaking. For reasons of tradition and continuity, governments are hesitant to innovate
with respect to decisionmaking structures, 94 and the innovations that administrative agencies
have undertaken are generally responsive to some government-specific need.95 If information
markets are to become a particularly useful tool in governmental decisionmaking, it will not be
because governmental decisionmakers themselves want to use the tool to improve their own
decisions. Rather, information markets are best justified as a means for disciplining
governmental decisionmaking. Part II.A explains why objective prediction tools might be
particularly useful in an area as rife with agency problems as governmental decisionmaking, and
it assesses the extent to which concerns about manipulation and unrepresentative traders
undercut the possibility of objectivity. Part II.B then considers a few specific examples of how
information markets might assist governmental decisionmaking, selecting examples that
illustrate various design problems with information markets.
A. The Objectivity of Information Markets
1. Why Objectivity Matters
Let us suppose that government researchers developed a crystal ball that allowed officials
to see what the future will be like under any given set of policies. Would the government use the
crystal ball? For some purposes, perhaps not; we might not want to know our individual destinies
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or those of our favorite sports teams. But it is hard to imagine an area of administrative law for
which the crystal ball would not be useful. The Department of Homeland Security could
anticipate terrorist attacks, and a Department of Precrime could intervene to stop murders before
they occur. 96 The Environmental Protection Agency could assess the effects of both global
warming and the policies that might limit it. The Securities and Exchange Commission could
consider which market rules would lead to the highest future stock prices. The Immigration and
Naturalization Service could assess the effects of immigration on economic growth and crime.
And on and on. None of these analyses would be sufficient to determine the course of policy, for
in all of these areas, few if any policies are Pareto efficient.97 But a crystal ball surely would at
least be useful by narrowing administrative decisionmaking to the selection of which world we
would prefer.
Information markets are not a crystal ball. They cannot predict what will happen; rather,
they can only give us probabilistic predictions. But let us suppose that information markets are
accurate, in the sense that they aggregate information as well as alternative approaches such as
hiring experts, and that they are objective, in that they have no ideological or other biases and
cannot be manipulated by government or outside agents. Suppose further that they are accepted
as providing a best guess, so that an argument against an information market prediction would
receive little weight in policy discourse. While information markets cannot allow us to select a
single future, with these assumptions they can permit us to select from a probability distribution
of possible futures, at least based on the variables that we select for the markets to predict. This
still narrows agency decisionmaking down to normative assessments rather than to the task of
making scientific and other predictions. Of course, these assumptions are not trivial, 98 and
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ultimately information markets’ usefulness depends on difficult evaluations of the extent to
which they are and might be true.
The immediate question is why narrowing agency decisionmaking to normative questions
would be useful. It might seem that if we set aside the possibility that information markets
achieve better information aggregation than any comparably costly individual decisionmaker, it
should not matter whether the government uses them. On this argument, information markets
represent a privatization of government functions without resource savings and should thus be a
matter of indifference. The problem with this argument is that it focuses exclusively on different
information aggregation technologies rather than on how agents might use or misuse such
technologies. The danger is that administrative agencies might make factual assessments in order
to support decisions that they would like to make for normative reasons.99 Deprived of the ability
to announce misleading predictions, agency officials would need to defend their decisions with
normative arguments alone. To the extent that these normative arguments are unpersuasive,
agency officials might suffer the reputational costs that a decisionmaker bears when observers
view a decision as nothing more than an ipse dixit,100 as well as face an increased possibility of
skeptical judicial review.101
Although information markets that generate predictions of objective variables are only
precursors to subsequent normative agency decisions, they can help discipline the process of
making those decisions. Another analytical tool, cost-benefit analysis, has often been identified
as achieving a similar type of discipline. Commentators have emphasized that cost-benefit
analysis helps to reduce cognitive errors and the effect of political factors, such as interest groups
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or ideology, on legal policy. The parallel is incomplete, as agency officials may have some
ability to control the numbers produced by cost-benefit analysis that they would not have with
information markets, but I will return to that problem later by showing how information markets
might be combined with cost-benefit analysis to reduce such control. 102 The comparison,
however, is useful, as information markets can increase predictive assessments objectivity in
much the same way that cost-benefit analysis can increase normative assessments objectivity, as
the following subsections explain.
a. Cognitive Errors

The simplest defense of cost-benefit analysis is that it prevents bad policies, which are
policies whose costs, if enacted, would exceed their benefits. 103 Such a defense invites the
question of why governmental officials would choose bad policies in the absence of cost-benefit
analysis, a question to which Cass Sunstein poses one possible answer in Cognition and CostBenefit Analysis.104 Sunstein argues “that cost-benefit analysis is best defended as a means of
overcoming predictable problems in individual and social cognition.” 105 By “predictable
problems,” Sunstein means the heuristics that cognitive psychologists have identified as
producing systematic biases in human decisionmaking,106 as well as the social dynamics that can
cause group decisionmaking to err.107 Cost-benefit analysis’s methodology enforces a rigor that
can help decisionmakers overcome such pitfalls, pointing them to what is really at stake in a
decision.
As the most significant example, Sunstein cites the availability heuristic,108 which refers
to the tendency of people to think that events are more likely if they can recall past examples of
such events. Writing with Timur Kuran, Cass Sunstein has previously emphasized the danger
102
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that this heuristic will lead to “availability cascades,”109 a vicious cycle in which an event leads
individuals to overestimate a risk, in turn affecting public discourse, which then makes
exacerbates the initial overestimation.110 As an example, Sunstein cites the Love Canal episode,
in which residents’ concerns about environmental contamination from a toxic waste dump
snowballed, eventually leading to mass relocations,111 even though there was no valid scientific
evidence validating their concerns.112 The ultimate effect, Sunstein suggests, was even more
dramatic, leading to passage of the Superfund statute,113 which critics have suggested is one of
the most expensive and least effective environmental statutes,114 given the relatively small risk
posed by toxic waste dumps.115
Cost-benefit analysis might have thwarted the Love Canal availability cascade by forcing
governmental officials to make explicit estimates of risk based on scientific data. 116 An
information market might have a similar effect. For example, an information market might have
been invoked to predict cancer rates in various communities. A prediction that the cancer rates in
communities near dumps would be comparable to the rates in communities lacking dumps would
provide an objective datum indicating that there was an overreaction. Information markets might
also be used for other availability cascades that Sunstein has perceived, such as the public
overreaction that he believes occurred to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.117 In that case,
for example, an information market might have been used to predict future deaths from
terrorism, possibly conditional on different governmental policies. Such a market might have
produced an objective datum that the risk was small, or it might have suggested that the risk was
quite large, especially once the danger of nuclear terrorism is taken into account.118 At the same
109
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time, an information market preceding September 11 might have suggested that insufficient
attention was being paid to the dangers of terrorism.
A significant caution is in order here. Just because an information market exists does not
mean that it will stop an availability cascade, even assuming that it makes an accurate prediction.
Public officials might well ignore the results of an information market, downplaying any data
that seem inconsistent with public concerns. This is, however, a limitation of cost-benefit
analysis and other objective guides to policy as well. 119 Any methodology for improving
governmental decisionmaking can be successful only to the extent that it is followed.
Administrative agency officials might seek to institute information markets as a way of
preventing availability cascades from emerging, but officials might also like to play on public
fears, either to seem responsive or because they might prefer a greater amount of risk regulation
than a well-informed public would choose.
There are at least two possible routes that could lead the government to make decisions
consistent with approaches like cost-benefit analysis and information markets. One is general
acceptance. Such acceptance has eluded cost-benefit analysis, 120 perhaps in part because of
legitimate claims that it favors particular values over others.121 Even if information markets do
prove to be accurate and objective, the public may be skeptical of their results. Their relative lack
of prominence makes acceptance of their predictions particularly unlikely, although in the long
term, their focus on predictions rather than on values may encourage their acceptance, especially
if they prove prescient and their accuracy is publicized. The second route is to enact a set of rules
requiring that administrative agency decisionmakers engage these methodologies and factor them
into their decisions. 122 Attempts to institutionalize cost-benefit analysis have been at least
moderately successful,123 though the courts have held that some agencies cannot use cost-benefit
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analysis. 124 I will consider the role that information markets might play in judicial review
below.125
b. Politics

A separate virtue of cost-benefit analysis is that it may allow for easier monitoring of
agencies by their principals, the President and Congress. Eric Posner has argued that cost-benefit
analysis may help to overcome informational advantages that agencies have over the President
and Congress by forcing an agency to convey information about projects.126 Cost-benefit thus
produces not only better projects from the perspective of social welfare, but also better projects
from the perspective of the President,127 who Posner assumes can veto agency plans.128 Perhaps
surprisingly, Posner’s model suggests that cost-benefit analysis will lead to enactment of more
regulations, as the President will trust the agency more once it must back up its recommendations
with cost-benefit analysis and the agency in turn will propose more projects that the President
otherwise would have rejected.129 Posner extends the analysis to situations in which Congress is
the principal or Congress and the President are both principals, concluding once again that costbenefit analysis helps the agency transmit information.130
Critical to Posner’s model is that cost-benefit analysis provides an objective datum about
the efficiency of projects. 131 Posner recognizes the possibility of agencies “bias[ing] the
outcomes in their own favor” to move policy closer to their ideal level of regulation,132 but his
model depends at least on the possibility that cost-benefit analysis might provide a means of
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overcoming an informational asymmetry and allowing a principal to monitor an agent. Whether
cost-benefit analysis in fact provides such a function,133 information markets would, assuming
that they are generally objective.134 Just as cost-benefit allows an agency to reassure the principal
that a particular project moves regulation in the principal’s preferred direction, so too could
information markets assure the principal that the regulation will be an improvement based on the
principal’s policy preferences. For example, a cost-benefit analysis showing that a regulation is
expected to save many lives could help assure a President who is more skeptical of
interventionist government than agency officials that there is indeed reason to believe that the
regulation will indeed produce considerable bang for whatever bucks are being expended.135
Posner’s model helps to underscore a straightforward point that is as applicable to
information markets as it is to cost-benefit analysis: Any tool that provides an objective
reflection on an agency’s decision makes it easier to separate the claimed and real justifications
for agency decisions. As a result, agencies are less likely to pursue policies when the real
justifications would be insufficient to persuade those who have some power over the agencies.
Yet agencies will be more able to pursue policies in which the claimed justification would in fact
be sufficiently persuasive, because information markets can reduce the informational asymmetry
and thus help to reduce distrust.
Perhaps the most significant implication is that information markets may help limit the
role of interest groups. Posner notes that “interest groups sometimes help government principals
control agencies by disclosing information to the principals,” 136 specifically by announcing
endorsement of or opposition to a particular regulation. Although such signals may have an
effect similar to cost-benefit analysis in reducing informational asymmetry, a consequence is that
interest groups may bias agencies’ project choices. 137 By neutralizing the informational
advantage, cost-benefit analysis eliminates the potential for such bias. Information markets can
do much the same thing.138 But they can also do something that cost-benefit analysis cannot do.
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As Posner acknowledges, “interest groups retain a hidden influence on the location of the other
players’ ideal points,” but cost-benefit analysis does not change this.139 Information markets may
frustrate agency officials’ ability to credibly claim illusory benefits from policies that are in
reality special interest giveaways. Information markets can thus lead agency officials concerned
with their credibility to act in a manner more consistent with the ideal points that they would
prefer to project to the public, who constitute the principal that they ultimately may care most
about.
2. Are Information Markets Objective?
The affirmative case for information markets’ objectivity is that they provide financial
incentives for honest predictions. When individuals are asked to make predictions in the absence
of a financial incentive, they might announce what they wish would happen or what they would
like to be seen as believing rather than what they truly believe.140 Financial incentives aimed at
accurate prediction may be sufficient to override these factors. Even if these incentives are
inadequate for some traders, other traders will have an incentive to trade against these financially
unmotivated traders, whose willingness to lose money for expressive purposes will ordinarily be
limited. Depending on the amount of money at stake, traders may even have an incentive to
gather information not previously publicly available to better inform their trading decisions.
There are, however, two significant caveats to this proposition, to be considered in each
of the following two subsections. The first danger is that some market participants might
affirmatively attempt to manipulate an information market because they have extrinsic reasons,
including possibly financial ones, to care about the results of that market. If attempts at
manipulation are successful, then the information markets may be biased, unless attempts by
opposing factions happen to cancel each other out. The second danger is that the demographics
of the trading population may influence results. For example, if traders happen to be on average
conservative, they may have honestly different beliefs, and thus predictions, with respect to
certain questions than those of a more demographically diverse group. It may not be enough for
information markets to produce honest predictions if the honest predictions are those of a
and other special-interest groups in a relatively stronger position. See, e.g., David Dana, Setting Environmental Priorities: The
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homogeneous group. Although there are theoretical reasons to believe that both these dangers
will be small, ultimately empirical evidence and analysis is necessary.
a. Market Manipulation

The Iowa Electronic Markets have appeared relatively immune to attempts at market
manipulation, though an occasional unexplained price spike suggests some reason for concern.141
A possible explanation for this, however, is that the Markets’ only effects are on the participants
themselves. Imagine, however, a world in which a large number of voters based their actual
election votes on the outcome of the Iowa Electronic Markets. This is somewhat fanciful,142 but
the hypothetical allows for consideration of what might occur if the government were to use
information markets as factors in their own decisionmaking. In the election hypothetical, there
would then be many individuals, from the candidates themselves to special interest groups, that
might be willing to accept some trading losses if their trading activity had an effect on the market
price and thus on the election. Similarly, in an information market used as a basis for agency
decisionmaking, anyone who might have an interest in the ultimate decision might transact with
the primary goal of manipulating market prices, even if such manipulation resulted in financial
loss for the trading party.143
If such manipulation were possible, particularly if it could have more than a trivial effect
on market prices, then the case for the objectivity of information markets is reduced. Market
manipulation is likely to be impossible, however, whenever market participants can detect that
the manipulation has changed asset prices in an objectively unjustifiable way. Suppose, for
example, that Bill Gates seeks to pour money into the securities corresponding to the Green Party
in a hypothetical version of the Iowa Electronic Markets, attempting to drive the price of such
securities up. This would create an immediate opportunity even for arbitrageurs with no
knowledge of the security’s true value, because the price of the various securities would add up
to more than $1. By investing $1, an arbitrageur could receive one of each security, selling them
141
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all at market prices, and this activity would drive down the price of the Republican and
Democratic securities. Fundamental values traders, however, would recognize that the
Republican and Democratic securities were undervalued, and they would thus purchase these
securities, driving their prices back up.144 This market activity would attract other arbitrageurs
and fundamental value traders, and eventually even Gates would run out of money.
Gates, in this hypothetical, is effectively offering to make obviously losing bets. If Gates
were to announce that he would give away money to anyone who wanted it, then his money
would disappear quickly, and if he announced that he would bet anyone and everyone $1 that the
Green Party would win the Presidency, it would disappear with almost equal speed. An
information market structured like the Iowa Electronic Markets ensures the same dynamic. Some
additional protection against manipulation would be needed in an information market in which
the number of securities is constant. If, for example, there were a fixed number of Green Party
securities, then Gates could buy all of these securities, sell one of them to a friend for $1, and
then refuse to enter into any additional transactions. There are a number of possible solutions to
this problem, however. The market scoring rules approach described above offers a simple
one.145 By allowing anyone to displace the current predictor with a new prediction, this approach
would in effect allow market participants to take bets against anyone repeatedly entering
unsupportable predictions. It should thus similarly allow the market to counter manipulation
fairly quickly.
Quickly, however, may not be fast enough in certain cases. We have seen at least one blip
in the Iowa Electronic Markets data. What if such a blip occurred in an information market used
to support a decision at exactly the moment that the market terminated? That could happen for
reasons other than pure coincidence. If there is a fixed point in time at which a snapshot of
market prices is to be taken for decision purposes, then potential manipulators would have an
incentive to wait until just before this point in time to act. There is, however, a potential antidote
to this problem. Instead of setting a fixed point at which the market would end, the sponsors of
an information market might leave the exact end time ambiguous, even if there is some period in
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which the market is assured to be open.146 Moreover, the market sponsor might provide that the
market will close only after some period of time during which there has been relatively little
market activity potentially consistent with market manipulation. Such activity might be defined
as an unusually high volume of trading or unusually large shifts in market price.
This analysis provides strong reason to believe that as long as it is clear that a trader’s
activity has moved a security price away from its fundamental value, market forces should
respond. Robin Hanson reaches this conclusion as well,147 but he properly recognizes that this
will not always be the case. In information markets for which asymmetric information is
relevant, traders will be uncertain whether trades reflect genuine insider information or a trader’s
attempts at market manipulation. If the traders underestimate the extent to which a trade is based
on an attempt at manipulation, then that attempt may partly succeed. 148 On the other hand,
Hanson argues, if traders overestimate the extent to which a trade is based on a desire to bias,
then the attempt may backfire.149 Allowing interested parties to trade, Hanson argues, will not
increase the danger of successful manipulation, as long as market participants know which
parties are potentially interested, because other market participants remain free to conclude that
an interested trader’s activity reflects nothing about the security’s underlying asset value. 150
Moreover, he notes,151 interested traders provide a benefit to the market in the form of increased
liquidity, giving a greater incentive for fundamental value traders to engage in research because
they can now use such research to bet against those attempting to manipulate the market.
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If market participants could identify interested traders, Hanson is probably correct that
allowing trading will be harmless and even potentially beneficial. The real danger, though, is that
market participants will not be able to tell whether a certain trader is in fact an interested party.
Market participants would seek to estimate what portion of trading is likely to reflect that of
interested parties, and thus on average interested traders should not be able to change the market
price, but in any given case, market participants might underestimate or overestimate the portion
of trading attributable to that group. Indeed, the trick for interested parties would be to trade
more than market participants expect, producing a vicious expectations cycle leading to ever
more trading by interested parties.152 In sum, the possible existence of interested parties does not
seem likely to produce systematic bias, but there is concern that trading by such parties could add
considerable noise to market predictions.
This is the gloomy view, and the absence of expected systematic bias in favor of
interested parties makes it not so gloomy after all. There is, in any event, a more optimistic view,
which suggests that information markets will be relatively efficient at distinguishing between
trading based on information and trading based on desires to bias. Some traders will presumably
earn reputations for acting reliably on the basis of private information, which may include
private information that they have paid other parties to access. In a world with many information
markets, the market will trade against traders lacking such reputations, and they will thus be
unable to influence the market. Perhaps initial experiments with information markets will not be
sufficient to allow such reputations to build, but there would be strong long term incentives for
traders to build and monitor reputations. Traders who fail to produce reputable information will
often be unsuccessful in convincing others.
Whether the gloomy or the optimistic view is the appropriate one may well depend on the
context. For example, one goal of FutureMAP was to consider the extent to which information
markets may be able effectively to combine both public and top secret information.153 If all
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participants in a market have access to the same top secret information, or even if there is known
to be a critical mass of traders who have such access as well as information about who else has
such access, such markets may work well. But in a market in which individual traders may have
access to top secret information that they can not convey to other traders, market participants will
give some credence to any trades by someone who may have such information. Market
participants also would try to estimate the extent to which that individual may be biased because
of policy outcomes the individual hopes to influence, but once again this could reduce the
accuracy of market predictions.
By contrast, in a market that depends primarily on public information, or even on private
information that market participants could share with reputable parties who could verify it,
traders seem likely to place only minimal weight on the views of traders without reputations for
objectivity if they do not produce persuasive analyses in support of their positions. The only
danger here is that some traders without reputations might determine that they are better off
trading repeatedly on any information they obtain rather than trading on that information once
and then revealing the information later. That is, a trader perversely could benefit from others’
skepticism about whether the trade is really supported by information, because the skepticism
allows the trader to repeatedly trade against the skeptics. This may be unlikely, because traders
would have some incentive to improve their reputations by showing that their trades are
consistently information-based.154 If this strategy did emerge, however, the market would grant at
least some credence to traders without reputations, while still trying to estimate the total amount
of bias, because any trade might reflect this strategy. Thus, if traders might have an incentive to
suppress the information justifying their trades, market accuracy once again will be reduced, and
traders who manipulate the market more than they are expected to will benefit.
There is, however, a relatively straightforward, if counterintuitive, approach to
encouraging traders to reveal the information on which they base their decisions. The market
could be divided into two phases, a first phase and a very short second phase, long enough for
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market participants to counter any sudden price swings but not long enough for any substantial
analysis. The closing price of the second phase, rather than the event ultimately at issue, would
determine the liquidation values for all trades made during the first phase.155 In effect, this is a
double information market, using one information market to predict the results of a second,
which in turn predicts the result of interest. While the goal of a trader in the first phase is only to
predict the outcome of the second, the knowledge that traders in the second will be seeking to
predict the ultimate outcome means that traders in the first phase will seek to predict the ultimate
event. The market sponsor could thus provide that the closing price of the securities in the first
market would be the basis for any subsequent decisions. While the second phase may appear
redundant, the second phase performs a useful function in disciplining pricing and behavior in
the first phase. Just the threat of discipline in the second phase should be sufficient to curtail
manipulation efforts, and minimal trading would be expected to occur during this phase.
This two phase approach admittedly would make the market a bit less intuitive to
participants, and it might well be unnecessary. The approach does, however, give market
participants incentives to reveal information supporting their trades, and eliminates the strategy
of withholding information to increase trading profits.156 Those who fail to convince other market
participants that their first phase trades are justified will be unable to profit from the information
on which they have traded, because the second phase, rather than the actual event, determines
first-phase profits. A trader, meanwhile, would not be able to withhold information for strategic
purposes in the first phase, because the second phase is too short for information to be processed.
Meanwhile, there would be no reason for someone with actual information to wait until the
second phase to trade on that information, because it would be impossible to trade repeatedly on
information in the second phase. The strategy of taking advantage of skepticism to increase
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trading profits will not work in the second phase, for that strategy depends on market participants
thinking that there is some chance that a trade is really an attempt to manipulate the market. No
one would have an incentive to manipulate the market in the second phase, because the ultimate
decisionmaker considers only the closing prices at the end of the first phase.
By promoting sharing of information, the two-phase approach seems likely to increase
information markets’ accuracy both directly and indirectly, because the sharing will make it
easier to identify traders who are trading without a sufficient reason for doing so. Regardless of
whether this method is used, it is worth emphasizing that information markets will not on
average be biased in favor of those who have incentives to manipulate the market, because other
participants are just as likely to overestimate as to underestimate the extent to which they try to
engage in manipulation. Ultimately, the extent to which the possibility of manipulation reduces
the accuracy of markets in which people have incentives to manipulate is an empirical question.
An experiment involving a large number of securities could be used to address this question; if
some individuals are given incentives to care about the prices of some randomly selected
securities. The experiment could also examine whether it matters if an incentive to manipulate is
conveyed only privately to one trader or announced publicly. Until such experiments verify that
there is some means of structuring information markets to minimize problems associated with
manipulation, government agencies will need to be quite cautious in relying on the results of
such markets. The analysis in this section, however, suggests that there is considerable reason for
optimism.
b. Unrepresentative Decisionmakers

An additional potential objection to relying on the results of information markets for
governmental decisionmaking in particular is that such reliance means that an unrepresentative
group of traders is in effect making decisions for society as a whole. This objection may come in
two distinct flavors. The first is that even if traders were excellent predictors, relying on traders
is democratically illegitimate because the traders are not democratically elected. This objection
identifies an instinctive discomfort that democratic theorists have to private entities governing
the public, but the discomfort comes from the concern that private entities may act on behalf of

46

their own interests rather than those of society as a whole. 157 The discomfort thus seems
misplaced if indeed market predictions are unbiased; if democratically selected officials place
weight in their decisionmaking on unbiased information, regardless of whether the producers of
the unbiased information engage in voting behavior that suggests that they wish the unbiased
information they produce were different, it seems unproblematic. At least this is true as long as
attempts to manipulate the market fail.158
The second flavor of the objection concedes this counterargument but worries that the
results of information markets might include an unintentional bias. The argument is that even if a
market is not manipulated by any individual participant or set of participants, perhaps the
identity of the participants as a whole might affect the market outcome. Information market
participants are not likely to be representative of the population as a whole. Aside from being
more expert in the relevant area, they might be wealthier or have systematically different
political views. Suppose, for example, that the participants in the hypothetical airline safety
regulations information market tend to be individually more sympathetic to market-oriented
solutions than airline safety experts in general or than the population as a whole. One might then
worry that predictions by this market might be systematically different from predictions in a
hypothetically more representative government because the decisionmakers might generally
predict a smaller number of lives saved than a more representative group.
The limited experimental evidence produced by the Iowa Electronic Markets suggests
that this is not likely to be a problem. Bias in an election market would be consistent with what is
referred to by cognitive psychologists as the “false consensus effect,” in which individuals
overestimate the number of others who share their views.159 Robert Forsythe et al. studied the
participants in the 1988 Presidential vote share market and collected, through polls, information
on traders’ political preferences.160 The market performed quite accurately, with election eve
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predictions coming within about one percentage point, 161 even though the traders consisted
entirely of individuals affiliated with the University of Iowa, including a disproportionate
number of business students, producing a trading population that identified as Republican and
favored George Bush somewhat more often than the population as a whole.162 On the whole,
traders tended to buy shares associated with their preferred candidates.163 The authors, however,
isolated one group of traders, whom they called marginal traders, who exhibited little to no
judgment bias. These traders were identified by the fact that they placed limit orders at prices
slightly different from the market price, while other traders placed either market orders or limit
orders at prices far from the market price.164 In effect, these marginal traders determined the
market price and ensured that judgmental bias did not affect the market,165 even though these
marginal traders were even less demographically representative than traders as a whole.166
Though cause for optimism, there are at least two reasons that this study is not a
conclusive repudiation of the possibility that traders’ demographic characteristics might affect
market prices. First, the closeness of election-eve predictions to the actual result does not
disprove the possibility of bias; perhaps the market prediction was slightly biased but by chance
the bias coincided with an election day surprise.167 An experimental design that might more
clearly control the effect of traders’ demographic composition would involve implementation of
a number of simultaneous markets, for example predicting vote shares in large numbers of
congressional races, with the composition of those permitted to trade in these markets selected
varied randomly across markets.168 A demonstration that groups of Democratic traders were no
more likely to be biased toward Democrats than other groups would bolster the Forsythe
findings. If, however, it turns out that group composition matters, then the further question, also
potentially testable, is to what extent group composition matters in open markets in which
161
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Id. at 1146 (noting, for example, that forty-six percent of traders identified themselves as Republican, compared with thirtyone percent in a national poll).
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if the price reaches a certain level. See generally Puneet Handa & Robert A. Schwartz, Limit Order Trading, 51 J. FIN. 1835
(1996) (explaining the rationale for limit orders).
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Forsythe et al., supra note 40, at 1156-57.
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Id. at 1158 (noting that all marginal traders were male and that 60 percent favored Bush after the third debate). The marginal
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anyone may participate.169 One possibility, supported indirectly by the experiments indicating
that a small percentage of informed traders is sufficient, 170 is that as long as there is some
minimal participation by a range of individuals, the results do not depend on the traders’ exact
composition.
Second, the conclusion that some trader diversity will ensure objectivity is not
necessarily generalizable to other forms of information markets, particularly those involving
complex models that individuals with different political views might view with different levels
of acceptance. Traders may recognize that others will have different political views but not give
credence to alternative models relevant to the immediate prediction. It is one thing for traders to
recognize that their preferred candidate may not win the election, but quite another for them to
grant equal weight to others’ views about economic policy. Conservative traders skeptical of
command-and-control regulation, for example, might apply a discount to lives saved by an air
safety regulation that liberal traders who believe government is relatively efficient might not
apply. A market with only conservative traders might reach a different result from one with only
liberal traders, even if the two groups would reach similar results in a market that, for example,
predicted whether a candidate who supported the command-and-control approach would win an
election.
This too is potentially empirically testable with an experimental design using a large
number of information markets operating simultaneously. For example, a number of markets
might be used to predict economic performance in a variety of different states or localities
contingent on passage of some Presidential initiative, such as a tax-cut proposal,171 with markets
again randomly assigned to allow only those with Democratic preferences, only those with
Republican preferences, and/or a mix to participate. Perhaps each individual group will contain a
sufficient number of marginal traders who are able to put their own views aside, and thus traders’
demographic composition will not matter, but the experiment may show that because Democratic
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A possible experimental methodology would examine predictions in sports information markets. See supra note 33 and
accompanying text (discussing such markets). If group composition matters, one might expect the markets to predict stronger
performance from relatively popular teams. Such a finding would not necessarily be dispositive to other contexts, because
participants might derive more utility from betting on the home team than from making a prediction consistent with a particular
political orientation. It is possible, though, that such preferences can be arbitraged away, providing a strong indication that
information markets are uninfluenced by what traders on average would like to see happen.
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See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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A potential problem here is the determination of whether the tax-cut proposal in fact passed. See infra note 213.
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traders simply think differently than Republican traders, the markets with more Democratic
traders would be more skeptical of the benefits of a Republican tax cut proposal.
While evidence indicating that an information market’s demographic composition can
affect the predictions these markets reach may invoke concern that militates toward placing less
weight on these markets in some contexts, it does not necessarily mean that these markets should
be ignored altogether. Even an assessment by a biased group may prove useful in governmental
decisionmaking, especially when the group’s prediction runs opposite its identified bias. The
effects of any bias may be small, and the magnitude of the effects may depend on the type of
information that the market is predicting. Demographic and ideological characteristics seem less
likely to matter, for example, in an information market predicting election returns than in an
information market predicting the economic consequences of the adoption of a particular
proposal, even assuming comparable analytical complexity in these two predictive problems.
Evidence that a trader personally believes that a particular proposal will be good for the economy
does not necessarily mean that the trader would then assume that others will recognize the
wisdom of the proposal and vote for the candidate associated with it.172
The more complex and controversial the relevant models are, and the greater the disparity
between the models’ evaluations and the individuals’ political beliefs, the greater the danger that
the traders composition could matter. Even a controversial market, such as a market to estimate
the effects of global warming,173 might be more objective relative to alternatives than would be
an information market making a noncontroversial prediction. 174 The situations in which
information markets may be least objective are the same as those in which governmental
decisionmaking is likely to be least objective, with the inherent difficulty of the projection task
making it more likely that agencies will make projections in accordance with their normative
views. An information market at least eliminates cheap talk,175 forcing those who take positions
172

Party officials, of course, will offer positive spin on how election news is good for their preferred candidate, but few of us
believe that the officials actually believe what they are saying. See Michael Kinsley, True Lies, NEW YORKER, Sept. 26, 1994, at
48, 50 (reviewing JAMES CARVILLE & MARY MATALIN, ALL'S FAIR: LOVE, WAR AND RUNNING FOR PRESIDENT (1994)) (pointing
out how the insistence by the two prominent political “spin control” artists that they never lie looks hollow in the face of the
stories they tell describing their great “spin control” victories). But we are less likely to doubt party officials’ claims that they in
fact prefer the candidate they are working for to the alternatives.
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Compare, e.g., BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE OF THE WORLD 258-322
(2001) (expressing skepticism about models predicting global warming), with LAURENCE PRINGLE, GLOBAL WARMING: THE
THREAT OF THE EARTH’S CHANGING CLIMATE (2003) (arguing that global warming does present a threat).
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Such a market, however, is unlikely to have any immediate political consequences. See infra text accompanying note 260.
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Cf. Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and Courtship: Cheap Talk Economics and the Law of Contract Formation, 85 VA.
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even on controversial matters to back up their predictions with money.176 The relative advantage
of information markets is thus likely to be greatest where talk is cheapest. Any lack of objectivity
from information markets may be of greater concern than a comparable lack of objectivity by
agency officials, because such officials are at least selected by democratic processes. But almost
any tool that agencies use in their decisionmaking—including more traditional means of
consulting experts177—can introduce subjectivity without a solid democratic pedigree into the
administrative decisionmaking process. Just because information markets seek to increase
decisionmaking’s objectivity does not render fatal any failure to obtain a perfectly objective
decisionmaking process.
B. Some Potential Governmental Uses for Information Markets
This section describes potential governmental uses for information markets. This is a
very partial list.178 Every administrative agency makes policy decisions, and such decisions are
almost always based implicitly on predictions about what the future will bring or how different
decisions will affect the future. The examples here are not information markets’ most
straightforward applications; to the contrary, they illustrate a range of design challenges. Nor are
they chosen for political enactability, though given the FutureMAP controversy, no information
market proposal is likely to be enactable at least in the near future. Part II.B.1 addresses the
direct goal of the FutureMAP program, considering whether information markets might help
identify security vulnerabilities. Though this section explains how objective assessments might
produce useful political feedback, it also recognizes problems with the particular application that

L. REV. 385, 412 (1999) (“Formally, cheap talk is defined as a message that does not directly affect the payoff of either the
message's sender or receiver.”).
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Without an information market, the government can take a position on global warming to support other goals. For example, if
the Bush Administration is concerned that environmental regulation may be too expensive, it might claim skepticism on global
warming. Cf. Eric Pianin, Group Meets on Global Warming, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2002, at A8 (noting Bush Administration
skepticism about the causes and effects of global warming, along with environmentalists’ response that adequate evidence exists).
Of course, the same possibility could occur in reverse; an administration sympathetic to environmental concerns could discount
any doubts about global warming because it would like to minimize air pollution in any event. Information markets will not
reflect information that participants wish were true will reflect information that participants believe to be true. Markets are thus
potentially not objective only when people have trouble separating the two.
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Groups of experts themselves may not be random samples of the population. Those who decide to obtain training in
environmental policy, for example, may be on average more liberal than the population at large and thus produce different policy
recommendations than environmental experts would in a hypothetical world where educational choices were uncorrelated with
political beliefs.
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As the New York Times reported in an article on information markets that appeared two months before the recent controversy,
“[o]nce you get the idea, the possibilities are endless.” Hal R. Varian, A Market Approach to Politics, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2003,
at C2.
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reinforce the proposition that information markets must be carefully designed. Part II.B.2
provides an example involving information markets with very large numbers of securities,
assessing the extent to which such markets might help regulators assess the solvency of
individual financial institutions. Part II.B.3 shows how information markets might help provide
objective forecasts, in this case with respect to budget deficits, and overcome partisan disputes
about methodology. Finally, Part II.B.4 shows how an information market might be used to
predict a future governmental decision and help administrative agencies enact interim regulations
while they consider long term solutions.
1. Homeland Security Vulnerabilities
One of the goals of the FutureMAP program was to use information markets to improve
homeland security. An information market could be adapted toward identifying degrees of
vulnerability. An initial test market was used to predict the number of days in a month
corresponding to each threat level—“red,” “orange,” and so on—providing the public with a
prediction of the average threat level expected over the month.179 This market received no public
attention, but the example illustrates a modestly useful potential application of information
markets more generally. While the government raises and lowers threat levels depending on its
assessment of intelligence, it does not make predictions of where the threat level is likely to be.
Yet Americans might want to factor the anticipated threat level in making travel plans, and a
summary could be useful for corporate and local governmental planning as well. An information
market provides a simple way for the government to provide some guidance without releasing
any supporting information. Of course, the market would incorporate only information known to
its participants, so it might not have turned out to have much predictive power. Even if
employees with security clearances were prohibited from participating, however, the market at
least could have provided a summary of what experts without clearances anticipated about threat
levels.
This simple example, however, presents some of the technical and other challenges of the
approach that the more controversial later experiment, called the Policy Analysis Market, was to
have taken. That market would have been used to predict the probability of specific events and
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specific types of attacks. Although the precise nature of the market’s securities was not
released,180 it is easy to imagine possibilities. For example, an information market might be used
to predict the total amount of property damage from cyberterrorism attacks in a particular year.
At the end of that year, the government would estimate the amount of property damage, and that
estimate would be used to liquidate the market. Similarly, such markets might be used to predict
the number of people killed from attacks on the water supply. Markets could even be used to
assess the vulnerability of particular targets, such as the Sears Tower 181 or the Palo Verde
Nuclear Plant.182 A comprehensive program might allow trading on all conceived possible means
of attack and all prominent individual targets, using markets predicting damage from “other
means” and to “other targets” to develop a comprehensive picture of terrorist threats.
At least from a political perspective, the principal problem with such a market appears to
be that it seems distasteful. Sen. Hillary Clinton, for example, criticized the program as “a
futures market in death.”183 Perhaps this criticism merely reflects intuitive revulsion, or perhaps it
is based on a theory that futures markets are commodificationist and destroy personhood.184 A
full consideration of the implications of commodification theory is beyond the scope of this
article, but unless many of our fundamental economic practices are in need of reform, such
considerations cannot be dispositive. We tolerate similar distastefulness in other contexts, after
all, where it is particularly useful. Life insurance companies set prices based on assessments of
when people will die, and providers of annuities and viatical companies in fact benefit when
people die. 185 The economic value of a reversionary interest in a life estate depends on an
individual’s age.
The promise of such a market is that it might help expose imbalances in resource
allocations, especially those associated with salient threats. Suppose, for example, that the United
States has paid excessive attention to safeguarding air travel and insufficient attention to certain
180

News reports indicated that the claims would include “whether Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat would be assassinated, or
Jordan's King Abdullah II would be overthrown.” See Kahn, supra note 7.
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See generally Robert L. Kaiser, Taking America’s Pulse Inside the Sears Tower, CHI. TRIBUNE, Sept. 8, 2002, available at
2002 WL 26639737 (reporting on concerns about the Sears Tower’s vulnerability to terrorist attacks).
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http://www.oregonlive.com/news/oregonian/index.ssf?/base/front_page/1059567193164150.xml.
184
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other threats. An information market prediction indicating greater risk from other threats would
be consistent with that claim. A limitation of such markets is that data on threats alone is
insufficient to justify a policy conclusion. In theory, the marginal decrease in risk associated with
the last dollar of spending to combat each of a variety of threats should be equal,186 but the
information markets measure only the risk side of the equation, not the extent to which spending
can address that risk. Conditional markets are a possible solution here, though the caveats about
such markets discussed above187 are compounded by the non-binary nature of the decision of
how much money to allocate to each risk. Given the wide range of policy responses to potential
terrorist risks, it might be difficult to create information markets that would sufficiently assess
the full range of policy options.188
In the absence of an adequate conditional market, an additional problem is the danger of
circularity. 189 Suppose, for example, that a trader identifies a new security vulnerability that
terrorists might exploit, but one that the government could address and eliminate if the market
price rose to reflect the risk. The information suggests that the security is undervalued, but if the
trader drives up the price of the security, it will then be overvalued as the government response
reduces the risk back to its initial level. It is difficult to predict how such a market will
equilibrate. Perhaps the optimal strategy might be to trade on securities only up to a point at
which the increased price would not trigger a government reaction. Information markets would
then reflect only information about which nothing can or would be expected to be done,
considerably reducing their usefulness. Maybe the optimal way to avoid this problem would be
for information markets to have a relatively short time horizon, perhaps estimating different risks
over a period of about a month.190 Such an approach would allow estimates of current risk levels
while still providing data to facilitate long-term responses.
186

A caveat is that it may make sense to spend extra on risks that cause the most anxiety. See Frank B. Cross, The Public Role in
Risk Control, 24 ENVTL. L. 887, 924-26 (1994) (considering “dread risks”).
187
See supra Part I.C.1.
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Gross, supra note 7.
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The problem upon which many critics of FutureMap focused is the danger that insider
trading profits might encourage terrorist acts. Insider trading in information markets generally
should be encouraged, because the purpose of such markets is to encourage consideration of all
potentially relevant information.191 Indeed, information markets in theory could even provide a
means of implementing anti-terrorism bounty programs. 192 The is, however, a concern that
terrorists might trade on their acts just before implementing them and thus profit from terrorism.
Worse, information markets could create a moral hazard problem,193 encouraging individuals
who otherwise would not have been terrorists to commit terrorist acts for profit.
The amount of money that could be made in this way, however, would be relatively
small, unless the government poured millions of dollars into such a market. Moreover, trading
activity might leave a paper trail that could lead to the terrorists’ apprehension and that might
prevent terrorists from cashing in on the appreciation in share value. The government could
require that traders be identified, perhaps even subject to background checks, and that
government payouts be made and transactions cleared only after it is determined that traders did

second more serious than the first. First, cognitive psychology experiments indicate that people generally are not as good at
estimating small probabilities. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 281 (1979). At least some market participants, however, would likely be sophisticated enough to
rely on formal models rather than intuitive probability estimations to guide trading in such a market. Second, what may be most
important in such a market is the relative prices of securities, reflecting the relative risk of different types of attacks. To make
comparisons of security prices meaningful, the government would need to promise a relatively large payment in the event of an
actual terrorist attack, so that traders would have incentives to investigate the levels of different risks and factor them into trading
decisions.
191
The same argument can be made for traditional securities markets, and indeed Henry Manne has argued that insider trading
should generally be permitted, as insider trading will promote market efficiency. See HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND
THE STOCK MARKET (1966); see also Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 857 (1983) (building on Manne’s general thesis); David D. Haddock, Academic Hostility and SEC Acquiescence: Henry
Manne’s Insider Trading, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 313 (1999) (commenting on Manne’s work and its influence). Whatever the
merits of Manne’s claim as applied to the stock market, it seems powerful in the context of an information market. An
information market’s sole purpose is to encourage the release of information, and the welfare of market participants is not a
significant concern. Thus, the strongest counterarguments to Manne’s theory do not apply. For example, Michael Manove has
argued that insider trading may discourage corporate investment, but corporate investment is not an issue here. See Michael
Manove, The Harm from Insider Trading and Informed Speculation, 104 Q.J. ECON. 823 (1989).
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not themselves participate in any terrorist acts. With appropriate regulation, an information
market would become an extremely unlikely venue for this type of scheme. It would be far easier
to make money by trading on conventional securities markets,194 or even by bribing a basketball
player to shave a few points in a game. Nonetheless, even if the possibility of such side effects
are remote, the worst case scenario may be so serious that even the probability-adjusted costs
might outweigh any benefits of such a program. In retrospect, the moral hazard danger made this
application of information markets a poor choice for preliminary experimentation, although the
project might not have been funded at all in the absence of the terrorism hook.
2. Solvency Regulation
The primary virtue of terrorist vulnerability information markets is that they help expose
resource misallocations, possibly providing feedback to the governmental decisionmakers, and
ultimately leading to the correction of such misallocations. Information markets might prove
more directly useful, however, at governmental tasks that are explicitly predictive and involve
processing of massive amounts of information. A useful example, though in the end perhaps not
a practicable one, is solvency regulation. The federal agencies that share responsibilities for
regulating depository institutions regularly monitor those institutions’ financial performance to
prevent insolvency.195 A principal justification for such monitoring is that with federal deposit
insurance, institutions in danger of insolvency have an incentive to take excessively risky bets in
a last desperate effort to avoid losing their investments.196 States engage in a similar form of
monitoring of insurance companies, seeking to ensure that insurance companies will be able to
meet their obligations even in the event of unexpectedly high liabilities.197 In both cases, the
regulatory regime is complicated, as regulators focus on a variety of indicia of safety, such as
reserve ratios and other capital standards.
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Simple information markets could be used to provide some form of political feedback.
For example, a market might be used to predict the number of depository institutions that will be
expected to go insolvent in a particular year or the total dollar amount of the federal government
bailout corresponding to such failures. Such a market might have led to earlier recognition of the
savings and loan crisis in the 1980s.198 Although such recognition presumably would not have
averted closures, it might have prevented some of the high-risk activity that exacerbated the
problem.199 The more challenging task for information markets, however, would be to perform
the task of monitoring individual institutions. The goal, after all, of these regulatory regimes is to
make individualized predictions about the likelihood of insolvency and the corresponding
likelihood of either consumer or governmental losses, or both, in the event of insolvency. Such
markets could foster more objective decisionmaking. Given the criticism that special interests
have affected monitoring in the past, 200 objective predictions might be a considerable
improvement.
The large number of institutions at issue should not be a significant problem for such a
market, as long as a different security is issued for each one. Just as traders in the Hollywood
Stock Exchange, or any other information market, have incentives to consider each security
individually,201 so too would insolvency information markets’ traders, assuming that there was a
sufficient financial incentive. The greater challenge is overcoming traders’ limited access to
relevant information. Although mandatory reporting requirements furnish some publicly
available data, governmental inspections are a key aspect of such regulatory regimes.202 Privacy
considerations presumably would prevent traders from obtaining the full access that
governmental officials enjoy. Traders would thus need to base their predictions on publicly
available information and any other information that they are able privately to obtain.
198

See generally Carl Felsenfeld, The Savings and Loan Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S7 (1991) (providing an overview of the
crisis).
199
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That information alone, however, may be sufficient to enhance the monitoring process.
Whistleblowers with particular knowledge of problems at depository institutions have an
incentive to trade on the information and thus reveal the problems. Depository institutions,
moreover, would have some incentives to open up their files to private parties that will
independently verify their financial information, lest traders infer from a lack of cooperation that
the institutions are hiding information.203 Theory alone is insufficient to predict the extent to
which these dynamics will affect information markets’ success at incorporating private
information. Even a financially modest experiment, publicly or privately financed, could provide
traders with sufficient incentives to develop models predicting the probability of insolvency
based on public information,204 and such models might help overcome any loopholes in current
governmental accounting rules that may allow institutions in danger to clear government
benchmarks. In theory, if such an experiment proved successful, governmental agencies could
consider as a next step incorporating market predictions into governmental formulas determining
the extent of governmental intervention.
3. Budget Forecasts
The examples so far have involved areas in which the application of information markets
may be controversial, but the policy issues corresponding to the relevant predictions tend not to
be controversial. Information markets could be used in more controversial areas, but many
information markets assessing controversial issues might offer little other than academic value.
For example, it would be straightforward, if macabre, to use a conditional market to assess the
deterrence effect of the death penalty, by creating securities whose redemption value would
depend, for a particular geographic area, on both the number of executions in a specified time
period and the number of murders in the next time period.205 Yet, for at least two reasons, such a
203

Once some institutions reveal information, an adverse selection effect increases the pressure on other institutions to do so as
well. Because an institution will have an incentive to allow inspections whenever they believe that traders are overly suspicious
of them, the best of the institutions that initially do not reveal information will have a strong incentive to do so. This dynamic can
produce an unraveling effect, so that even institutions who fear that inspections will reveal negative information will allow such
inspections lest traders infer that the situation is even worse than it actually is. See generally Paul Milgrom & John Roberts,
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and after such executions. See Hashem Dezbakhsh et al., Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from
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study would be likely to play only a peripheral role in the death penalty debate. First, although
deterrence figures largely in debates on the death penalty, people’s views on the death penalty
may depend more on the extent to which they believe in retributive justifications for
punishment. 206 Second, an information market prediction does not resolve the underlying
question, but provides at most a best guess. An information market is thus akin to event studies
in corporate law, serving as a sophisticated form of opinion poll that might prove incorrect.207 An
information market thus provides the educated analyst little reason to change an opinion, and on
an issue like the death penalty, there are likely to be highly knowledgeable experts on both sides.
If information markets ever were to receive acceptance as a legitimate tool, then
information markets on controversial issues would most likely be relevant when competing
parties have some incentive to commit to them in advance. One area in which this might be true
would be in budget forecasting, for example the prediction of the size of government deficits in
future years conditional on the enactment of legislation.208 A desire to have relatively objective
data has led Congress to create the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which generally is
viewed as seeking to guard its independence and thus the integrity of its estimates.209 Budget
issues, however, can become political despite such attempts, in part because the majority party
appoints the leadership of the CBO. 210 A prominent controversy has been whether budget
forecasters should employ “dynamic scoring,”211 a method that assumes tax cuts will increase
economic growth, and how much dynamic scoring they should allow.212 The disagreements about
the accuracy of dynamic scoring may imperil the legitimacy of budget forecasts, and potentially
both parties could be amenable to a solution that would depoliticize forecasts.
Post-Moratorium
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Data
(2003)
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Information markets offer a straightforward solution, which presumably would
incorporate dynamic considerations to some extent but not as much as dynamic scoring’s most
ardent proponents might like. A simple approach would be for securities to be tied toward ex
post evaluations of the deficit, and conditional securities could be used to assess the effects of
different possible policies.213 A possible concern here is that there may be subjectiveness even in
such retrospective assessments, for example because of accounting issues concerning investment
and asset sales.214 As long as the identity and party affiliation of the budget officials who will
make the assessments is unknown, however, information markets will predict an average of what
different officials might be expected to decide,215 thus stripping political bias out of the estimate.
For the officials to be unknown, assessments should be scheduled for a significant period of
time, perhaps ten years, after the launch of the market, even when the year in question follows
soon afterward launch. This is a critical point, to which I will return in discussing predictive costbenefit analysis:216 The possibility for subjectiveness in determinations of market payouts is not a
problem as long as the ultimate decision is postponed and as long as a prediction of how an
average decisionmaker would make the assessment is sufficient for the relevant purpose.
4. Interim Regulation
That predictions in a budget forecasting information market are in fact predictions of a
future governmental assessment does not make that market unique. Any information market
requires that some individual, whether or not governmental, make a final assessment of what the
number being predicted turned out to be. Information markets, however, might be used to predict
not only governmental assessments made specifically for the purpose of concluding the markets,
but also governmental decisions on issues of regulation. In many administrative contexts, an
agency has insufficient resources to address all of the regulatory questions facing it. For
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example, the Environmental Protection Agency is notoriously slow in determining whether to
classify particular chemicals as pollutants.217 Similarly, the Food and Drug Administration has
often faced criticism for the amount of time that it takes to conduct drug trials.218 In these cases,
an information market might be used to predict the decision that the agency eventually will
reach, and that decision could be used to fashion an interim regulatory regime.
In the EPA context, for example, an information market might include a number of
securities corresponding to different chemicals, with the security to be liquidated at a set value if
the chemical eventually is classified as a carcinogen. Without conducting any scientific research
on its own, the agency might enact rules concerning the regulation of such carcinogens.
Conceivably, the EPA might decide to limit any expanded use of chemicals for which the
information market indicated a significant probability of ultimately being labeled a carcinogen.
A more elaborate information market might predict the “dose-response” curve corresponding to a
particular chemical.219 In such a market, securities would be traded predicting the effect of each
chemical on humans at various levels of exposure. Although these are notoriously difficult
assessments, 220 the market at least would provide an objective prediction of the EPA’s later
determination. The information market alone cannot determine the best interim legal regime,221
but it can provide an agency with limited resources data that it can use pending its own
investigation. At least, such an information market can help an agency decide which decisions to
prioritize.

217

See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 259-60 (1990).
For an evaluation of a federal statute that seeks to expedite the process, see Deborah G. Parver, Note, Expediting the Drug
Approval Process: An Analysis of the FDA Modernization Act of 1997, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1249 (1999).
219
“Dose/response assessment estimates the relationship between the amount, intensity, or duration of exposure and the risk of a
particular outcome (e.g., . . . a worker’s lifetime probability of contracting leukemia).” Robert A. Pollak, Regulating Risks, 33 J.
ECON. LIT. 179, 183 (1995).
220
See Sunstein, supra note 120, at 2279-80 (discussing dose-response curves and the difficulties of calculating them).
221
In the FDA context, a relevant question would be whether drugs should be provisionally allowed when there is a prediction
that they ultimately will be approved. An argument for such a rule is that many people may die while waiting for a drug to be
approved, and an information market prediction at least provides some assurance that the drug company is not seeking to deceive
consumers by peddling snake oil. Cf. Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations, 53 FED.
REG. 41516-01 (Oct. 21, 1988) (noting the FDA’s goal of “speed[ing] the availability of new therapies to desperately ill patients,
while preserving appropriate guarantees for safety and effectiveness”). A contrary argument is that the government might find it
difficult to eliminate supplies of the drug should it ultimately decide not to approve it.
218

61

C. Institutionalizing Information Markets
An information market used for interim regulation provides a useful example of why an
administrative agency might like to launch an information market. It also shows a modest way in
which an information market might be helpful in judicial review. Some critics of the
administrative process complain that it is “ossified,”222 with the cumbersomeness of notice-andcomment rulemaking preventing administrative agencies from enacting useful regulations. 223
Although the Administrative Procedure Act allows an agency to skip the notice-and-comment
process for “good cause,”224 courts have been reluctant to allow agencies to count the interim
nature of a rule as sufficient good cause.225 Such reluctance is understandable, given the danger
that agencies might abuse such a prerogative by regulating through series of interim rules. An
information market used to predict an ultimate agency decision, however, can provide the agency
with some data to support the view that it will indeed eventually find sufficient evidence to act in
a particular way. Perhaps this data would be sufficient to convince courts that interim regulation
is appropriate.
This is a modest use of information markets, complementing rather than replacing
existing decisionmaking processes. There are, however, likely to be many steps before agencies
and courts would use information markets even in this way. Even the now-defunct FutureMAP
program involved only experimental uses of information markets, and there was no indication
that the Defense Department would take the predictions of such information markets into
account in decisionmaking, let along present them to support its actions in judicial review.226 As I
have suggested, further experimentation would be necessary in any event to ensure that such
markets are sufficiently unbiased and invulnerable to attempts at manipulation. 227 Perhaps if
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experimentation confirms the promise of information markets, an intrepid agency might take an
additional cautious step by creating some information markets that provide public information
without any requirements that agency officials pay attention to such markets in making
decisions.228
Even apart from negative publicity, obstacles remain even to such invocation of
information markets. First, one might argue that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
has jurisdiction over information markets.229 The CFTC, however, has provided no action letters
for the Iowa Electronic Markets,230 and it presumably would do so as well for governmental
agencies. Second, gambling on information markets might be seen as a violation as state
gambling laws, 231 although federally authorized trading would be immunized under the
Supremacy Clause. 232 Third, there is no existing infrastructure to support the creation of
information markets. In theory, a number of agencies might create their own information market
programs, but there are presumably economies of scale to running information markets, and the
hassle of creating the infrastructure, combined with the publicity that would accompany any
agency that was the first to experiment with information markets after the FutureMAP debacle,
might discourage agencies that otherwise would be willing to devote some resources to particular
predictive tasks.
Perhaps a long time from now, FutureMAP will be a distant memory, and use of
information markets in the private sector or in other countries would lead to a sense that further
experimentation is warranted. Congressional intervention could greatly facilitate further
experimentation with information markets by administrative agencies. As an initial matter, a
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statute might explicitly empower agencies to create information markets, at least in the absence
of moral hazard concerns such as those present in the terrorism context. Such a statute would
eliminate any concerns about CFTC jurisdiction and gambling laws.233 In addition, Congress
might designate a particular agency, perhaps the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to
coordinate a single web site hosting information markets for a variety of agencies, with other
agencies providing the finances necessary for subsidizing their particular projects. Finally,
Congress might appropriate funds for specific projects, although agencies also might use lump
sum appropriations in the absence of specific funding.234 Perhaps concerns with appearances will
serve as a permanent block to such support, but at least if information markets became more
accepted among academic, there are no obvious interest groups that would be expected to oppose
such moves.
Even if the regulatory climate were more favorable, information markets probably would
not become pervasive in administrative decisionmaking. Cost-benefit analysis received a
significant impetus when President Reagan signed an executive order, 235 since renewed in
varying forms,236 mandating that it be used for certain decisions. A similar blanket policy is less
plausible for information markets, because discretion is needed to identify what types of
information to seek and how individual information markets should be designed. Thus,
information markets can grow only when individual agencies take initiative, either because of
genuine interest in the information produced, or because an agency wished to provide some
support for the predictive judgments influencing policy decisions. A President who wanted to
rationalize agency decisionmaking with information markets might give a single agency, such as
OMB, responsibility for deciding on appropriate prediction problems. That agency would then
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have much the same role that OMB has today in enforcing regulatory requirements ranging from
cost-benefit analysis to paperwork reduction.237
Should information markets exist on topics relevant to particular administrative
decisions, no amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act would be necessary for courts to
take them into account in checking the rationality of judicial policy decisions. Under the “hard
look” doctrine, one of the means by which courts assess whether agency actions are “arbitrary”
or “capricious,”238 courts closely analyze administrative agencies’ justifications for their policy
choices.239 In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.,240
for example, the Supreme Court scrutinized the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration’s interpretation of studies on the effect of seatbelt usage, noting that the agency’s
prediction of less than a five percentage point increase in safety belt usage failed to take into
account distinctions between two types of belts. 241 Similarly, a court might vacate an
administrative action when an agency has failed to produce an adequate explanation of why that
decision is justified given a particular prediction by an information market. This is a limited
power, as the court can only guarantee that the agency conducts a “reasoned analysis,”242 not that
the agency picks among a variety of reasonable conclusions that which the court thinks best. The
more objective data that courts have to assess administrative agency reasoning, however, the
more effectively courts will be able to conduct this task.
In theory, judicial review might take into account even privately run information markets.
Nothing in statutory or case law requires an agency or a court to consider only information that
the agency itself has created, and indeed agencies participating in notice and comment
presumably consider a wide range of evidence. If some form of private information market
existed and produced information relative to a particular administrative rulemaking, then both
237
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agencies and courts presumably could take such information into account. The Iowa Electronic
Markets exist despite regulatory obstacles, and it is plausible that universities or non-profit
organizations might create information markets devoted to particular policy issues. Judges at first
presumably would be reluctant to place any substantial weight on information market results, but
acceptance could build over time, and it would take but one judicial panel to take the first critical
step. My purpose, of course, is not to predict that information markets will figure in judicial
review any time soon, and my own instinct is to doubt it, but the open-endedness of
administrative law at least does not forbid the consideration of evidence from information
markets.
III. PREDICTIVE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND BEYOND

A principal challenge in creating information markets that the examples above
demonstrate is the determination of what information the markets should be constructed to
predict.243 The information must be sufficiently important to bear on the decision, but even once
a clearly relevant type of information is predicted, governmental decisions will often depend on a
variety of additional factors. The information markets described so far can provide inputs into
governmental decisions, but they cannot provide comprehensive assessments of the decisions
themselves. Predictive cost-benefit analysis provides at least a solution to these dilemmas, by
creating an information market to predict the outcome of a cost-benefit analysis. Because a costbenefit analysis can incorporate, at least in theory, all of the costs and benefits of a particular
decision, the methodology avoids the problem of defining the relevant contours of a decision. It
thus produces bottom-line assessments of potential government decisions. While existing
information markets predict subsequently objectively verifiable information, the potential for
comprehensive analysis of individual policy decisions makes predictive cost-benefit analysis a
useful candidate for the future.
Predictive cost-benefit analysis is attractive for reasons other than that it provides a
template that can easily accommodate virtually any form of governmental action. Predictive
cost-benefit analysis is responsive both to concerns about information markets and to concerns
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about traditional cost-benefit analysis. Although conditional markets can also be used to assess
individual decisions, predictive cost-benefit analysis overcomes some of the technical problems
that make the results of conditional markets difficult to interpret. A disadvantage of predictive
cost-benefit analysis relative to other information markets is that predictive cost-benefit analysis
results in predictions of what people will say their opinions are, and sometimes this might
deviate from what their opinions really are. In most contexts, however, this disadvantage is
minor, as a result of the most significant virtue of predictive cost-benefit analysis.
This virtue is that predictive cost-benefit analysis allows for an assessment of how an
average decisionmaker, rather than any particular decisionmaker, would rate a particular policy.
Unlike traditional cost-benefit analysis, predictive cost-benefit analysis will not vary based on
the happenstance of which political party or which particular individuals happen to be in control
of an agency at the time of the analysis. A proponent of traditional cost-benefit analysis might
protest that it would be worse to have politically moderate decisionmakers all of the time than to
have politically more extreme decisionmakers from opposite sides of the ideological spectrum
sharing power across time. Allowing Democrats free reign for a few years and Republicans for
another few years is better than having moderates always control policy, for example because
experimentation with different approaches is likely to produce useful feedback into the political
process.244 This perspective sees the abrupt shifts in power following elections as inherently
desirable rather than as the mere byproduct of a political system that seeks to enshrine the
preferences of a hypothetical median voter but can do so only approximately and only in fits and
starts.
Though important, this objection is beyond my scope, because my argument is simply
that predictive cost-benefit analysis is a more useful tool than traditional cost-benefit analysis,
not that agencies necessarily should be required to follow its recommendations. The more
decisionmakers can manipulate cost-benefit analysis to reflect their own preferences, the less
valuable cost-benefit analysis becomes as a signal of administrative action.245 At an extreme of
pliability, cost-benefit analysis becomes useless, providing meaningless positive evaluations of
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every administrative action that an agency wishes to take. The same motivations that lead
agencies to employ cost-benefit analysis, such as providing clear signals to other policy actors,
should thus motivate them to prefer relatively more objective forms of cost-benefit analysis, at
least if the cost of increasing objectivity is not so high and if others recognize the increase in
objectivity. If information markets generally are indeed relatively objective,246 then predictive
cost-benefit analysis also will be more objective than traditional cost-benefit analysis, in the
sense that it will be less sensitive to the identity of the policymaker. Perhaps there remains a
second-best argument that we should not seek to improve the objectivity of tools like cost-benefit
analysis for fear that they might be misused, but I will assume simply that if cost-benefit analysis
does exist, it might as well be as objective as possible.
Indeed, attempts to structure cost-benefit analysis by providing rigid ex ante rules about
measuring costs and benefits form one means by which agencies already seek to improve the
objectivity of their analyses. By providing an alternative means of assuring objectivity,
predictive cost-benefit analysis limits the need for such ex ante rules. It therefore can help
overcome the complaint that ex ante rules merely mask subjectivity, moving discretion from the
evaluators of individual policies to those who determine the form of cost-benefit analysis. This
complaint is at the heart of many debates about cost-benefit analysis and about regulatory policy
more generally, and Part III.B.2 will explain why predictive cost-benefit analysis should appease
both sides in a variety of such debates, even if considerable debate would remain about the
circumstances in which the results of predictive cost-benefit analysis should constrain or
motivate agency action. Before that, Part III.A will describe the mechanics of predictive costbenefit analysis, and Part III.B.1 will compare it to other information markets. Finally, in Part
III.C, I will describe a variant of predictive cost-benefit analysis, which I call comparative
benefit analysis and may be useful when it is difficult to measure aggregate benefits in dollars.
A. The Mechanics
The mechanics of predictive cost-benefit analysis are straightforward, once an
infrastructure for creating information markets exists. Suppose, for example, that the government
wished in 2004 to conduct a predictive cost-benefit analysis of a proposed policy to reduce
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arsenic in the water. The information market then would be initiated at that time, with a final
prediction taken at some designated time, say September 1, 2004, and the government could then
consider that prediction in deciding whether to enact the proposed policy. Then, at some far later
point, say September 1, 2014, the government would perform a cost-benefit analysis of the
policy, regardless of whether it in fact had decided to implement it. If the policy had been
adopted, that cost-benefit analysis would estimate the costs and benefits that had occurred as
well as any that might still result, discounting all to 2004 dollars; if it had not been adopted, the
analysis would estimate what the costs and benefits would have been, discounting once again.
The 2014 cost-benefit analysis would not have any direct policy effect, but it would determine
prices at which securities from the 2004 information market would be liquidated.
The case for predictive cost-benefit analysis is largely the same regardless of how the
information market component itself is constructed. Two innovations developed in Part I of this
Article will be particularly helpful here, however. First, auctioning off the right to be the first
participant helps solve a technical complication.247 The result of a cost-benefit analysis might be
a positive number (net benefits) or a negative one (net costs). 248 A security liquidated at a
negative number would mean that the holder of the security would pay money to the
government, so there should be no difficulty allowing trading of such a security. In effect, the
buyer receives money from the seller.249 But no one would want to be the initial holder of the
security. An auction, however, could allow negative bids, and when net costs are expected, the
highest bidder would be the one with the least negative bid. The government would then pay to
that bidder the corresponding amount to compensate for holding a security that ultimately is
expected to result in payments to the government. The risk associated with holding the security
would make this amount more than the expected eventual payment back to the government, with
the difference between these amounts the government’s expected cost from running the
information market.
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Second, the two-phase information market may be particularly useful.250 Of the benefits
of this approach already discussed, perhaps the most useful in this context is that it provides
incentives to share information. Information market participants would publicize any costs and
benefits that they expect future decisionmakers to take into account in their calculations.
Similarly, a trader who concludes that a particular methodology for estimating a cost or benefit is
flawed will have an incentive to trade on that and reveal the better methodology. The agency
officials eventually conducting the ex post cost-benefit analysis could then consider any
discussions during the information market in reaching their own conclusions, possibly saving
some expense. The two-phase approach, however, achieves an even more dramatic savings of
expense if, as might often be true, no transactions actually occur in the short second phase.
Recall that with the two-phase information market, trades in the first phase are liquidated based
on the estimate at the end of the second phase.251 The possibility of the second phase is necessary
to discipline the first phase, but once it exists, there would be no incentive to wait until that phase
to act on a prediction. The eventual measurement, here the ex post cost-benefit analysis, is
needed only to discipline any trades made in the second phase, so the measurement can be
skipped if there are no trades in the second phase to discipline. In such a case, trades in the first
phase would be resolved simply by the prediction at the end of the first phase.
Regardless of the form that the information market takes, it will result in a prediction of
what an average decisionmaker would be expected to decide. If, for example, the market
consensus is that Republicans would assess a regulation as having net costs of $50 million and
that Democrats would assess net benefits of $100 million, then, assuming that it is equally likely
that Republicans and Democrats will be in power ten years later, the market prediction would be
net benefits of $25 million. Traditional securities markets similarly assign probabilistic weights
to different possible contingencies. A stock price for a company that may be acquired, for
example, reflects the expected value of the company if it is and if it is not acquired and the
probability of acquisition. 252 Much the same result would occur if the market scoring rule
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described above were used.253 While the incentive of participants is to come as close as possible
to the eventual prediction, risk-averse participants will seek to minimize the risk associated with
deviation from predictions and thus choose intermediate predictions rather than extreme ones.254
Because the information market predicts what an average decisionmaker would decide, it
is not quite so important here as in traditional regulatory contexts to ensure that the actual
retrospective decisionmaker is highly qualified. The decisions of highly qualified decisionmakers
can be expected to differ from those of less qualified decisionmakers in two ways. First, less
qualified decisionmakers are likely to be less predictable, with a greater variance of cost-benefit
assessments.

Such

variance

is of

immediate

concern

in

traditional

administrative

decisionmaking, because anomalous decisionmaking has a policy effect. With predictive costbenefit analysis, however, the ex post evaluation has no direct policy effect, and thus the
possibility that some will err too high and others too low is of little concern.255 Second, less
qualified decisionmakers may systematically neglect subtle but important variables, or place too
much weight on variables that more qualified decisionmakers would recognize are not as
important as they might appear. This second effect remains of direct concern with predictive
cost-benefit analysis, although the incentives of traders to provide information defending their
choices256 may mute the effect.
Predictive cost-benefit analysis thus requires decisionmakers who are capable of
understanding all dimensions of the relevant problem but not necessarily experts in the particular
area. A virtue of using generalist decisionmakers, perhaps even decisionmakers not attached to
any particular agency, is that they are less likely to shade their retrospective evaluations based on
prospective agendas. Biased ex post decisionmakers present no hurdle to predictive cost-benefit
analysis as long as traders cannot anticipate the direction of the bias ex ante. Generalist
decisionmakers, however, reduce the chance that traders might anticipate systematic bias, for
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example because decisionmakers in a particular agency from both political parties might be
expected to share some normative commitments that generalists would reject.257 Regardless of
whether specialists or generalists are the ultimate decisionmakers, an agency must have some
procedure in place for selecting the relevant decisionmaker and ensuring that the cost-benefit
analysis is indeed performed. The procedure could simply be that the agency will designate the
decisionmaker; once again, even if the ultimate designation reflects idiosyncratic political
preferences, that does not matter so long as traders ex ante do not know which idiosyncratic
preferences will control.
B. Comparisons
I have identified objectivity as the chief virtue of information markets, and a particular
type of objectivity, independence from the current administration’s political and ideological
biases, as the chief virtue of predictive cost-benefit analysis. This independence provides
predictive cost-benefit analysis its principal advantage both over information markets used to
make predictions of objectively verifiable numbers and over traditional cost-benefit analysis. The
following subsections will explain why, after first assessing the disadvantages of predictive costbenefit analysis relative to positive information markets and traditional cost-benefit analysis.
1. Normative vs. Positive Markets
Suppose an administrative agency is considering a nationwide regulation that would ban
citizens from carrying concealed handguns. Robin Hanson has suggested that a conditional
market would be an ideal tool for evaluating the effect of such a policy change, allowing a
prediction to emerge about how the policy would affect the murder rate or the number of deaths
involving handguns. 258 It would be equally straightforward to use a predictive cost-benefit
analysis to assess how decisionmakers would evaluate the policy retrospectively. Neither
approach can guarantee the “correct” answer, as both approaches reflect only traders’
predictions. An advantage of the objective approach, however, is that it gives traders an incentive
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This raises the familiar debate about whether the beliefs of informed generalists should be preferred to those of specialists.
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984?: An Article on Delegation and
Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 775-91 (1983) (providing a skeptical view of the need for
specialized courts.
258
See Hanson, supra note 21, at 16.
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to predict the actual effects of the policy rather than what decisionmakers will claim they believe
the effects of those policy to be. If retrospective cost-benefit analysis is merely a form of
“position taking,” 259 then predictive cost-benefit analysis will reflect anticipated positions on
policy effects rather than the policy effects themselves.
This objection suffices to justify a conclusion that predictive cost-benefit analysis may
fail to uncover universal truths on the nation’s most controversial policy issues. But an
information market predicting an objectively verifiable number seems equally irrelevant to
government policy on such issues,260 because political actors are unlikely to yield to a prediction
on a controversial issue, even an objective one. A positive information market might influence
public opinion and thus indirectly political parties’ positions, but an agency is unlikely to ignore
the administration’s positions on a fundamental issue like gun control solely because of an
information market prediction. Predictive cost-benefit analysis may reflect average political
preferences as well as hard-nosed analysis, but this is more a virtue than a vice in the political
process. Predictive cost-benefit analysis will recommend against policies that all retrospective
decisionmakers are expected to conclude had net costs, even if such conclusions are expected to
be politically motivated rather than genuine. 261 Such policies would elude enactment in any
event, and a tool that recommended them would lack credibility in the political process. In
contrast, predictive cost-benefit analysis can verify whether an agency’s support for a policy is
idiosyncratic, providing a politically useful signal to the President, Congress and the courts,
rather than just providing objective analyses that in the long run might affect voters.
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“Position taking” is defined in the political science literature as the “public enunciation of a judgmental statement on anything
likely to be of interest to political actors.” DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 64 (1974). When engaging
in “position taking,” legislators are motivated by a desire to appeal to constituents or others, rather than by their underlying views
on the issues. Whether legislative behavior constitutes position taking is often controversial. See, e.g., Keith & Krhbiel &
Douglas Rivers, Sophisticated Voting in Congress: A Reconsideration, 52 J. POLITICS 548, 564 (1990) (considering a particular
example). With retrospective cost-benefit analysis, the more decisionmakers are expected to engage in “position taking,” the less
the underlying merits will matter.
260
See supra text accompanying note 207.
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When the subjective assessments predicted by predictive cost-benefit analysis point in a direction opposite from what an
positive information market would recommend, additional values besides whatever the objective market directly measures may
be at stake. Suppose, for example, that an positive information market would predict that a ban on concealed weapons would
reduce murders, cf. JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN-CONTROL LAWS (2000)
(arguing that laws permitting concealed weapons save lives), but a predictive cost-benefit analysis would anticipate greater costs
than benefits. The discrepancy might reflect concerns other than lives saved, such as the intrinsic discomfort of knowing that
many individuals have on their persons tools for ending lives. If these concerns are sufficiently powerful to affect conclusions
about the net benefits of a concealed weapons ban, then perhaps they should influence policy.
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Disingenuous policy evaluation should prove less dangerous with predictive cost-benefit
analysis than with traditional administrative decisionmaking anyway. One reason is that
disingenuousness will often roughly cancel out; an average decisionmaker is less likely than a
partisan to read evidence selectively. More significantly, the retrospective assessor will be less
susceptible to political and other forms of pressure than an administrative agency official making
an actual policy decision. The only effect of a decision is on the traders, and, at least for most
analyses, there would not be sufficient money at stake to cause traders to seek to influence the
process.262 Because the decision has no direct policy effect, interest groups should have far less
interest in retrospective evaluations of decisions made a decade before than in the original
decisions, and retrospective evaluations will receive less attention than actual decisions from
other agency officials, the public, the President, and Congress. The incentives of ex post
evaluators would be similar to the incentives of judges, including maintaining a reputation for
high-quality work. At times, evaluators might seek to demonstrate solidarity with the present or
past positions of a particular political party, or to use the retrospective valuations as a vehicle for
advancing a world view. But unless evaluators from one party or associated with one view are
more likely to act in this way than others, such tendencies will have no effect on predictions.
Like judges, indeed perhaps even more than judges because judges have a direct influence on
policy, 263 retrospective evaluators may care about demonstrating careful and competent
analysis.264
Predictive cost-benefit analysis’s predictions ordinarily should not differ greatly from
those of an positive information market evaluating the same effect of a policy. The predictions of
information markets are themselves informed opinions, and informed opinions about future
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If a sufficiently large amount of money is at stake, then some means of preventing or minimizing trader influence of the
eventual decisionmaker is necessary. A simple approach would be to ensure that the decisionmakers are independent. For
example, Article III judges rather than political officials might themselves choose the decisionmakers, at least if the decisions are
appealable to the courts. See, e.g., Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding that administrative law judges were
inferior officers, and thus eligible for the alternative appointment approaches specified in the Appointments Clause, because their
decisions are nonfinal). In addition, the decisionmakers might serve single, nonrenewable terms, and rules of procedure might
prevent ex parte contacts between traders and decisionmakers.
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A leading group of judicial politics scholars contend that judges tend to vote their “attitudes.” See JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). Retrospective evaluators might
suppress their attitudes more, given the inability actually to affect policy. On the other hand, the absence of policy consequences
might liberate the evaluators to entertain even extreme positions.
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See Sidney E. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative
Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1053 (1995) (identifying “craft” and “outcome” as two goals that judges seek to achieve); see also
Brett G. Scharffs, Law as Craft, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2245 (2001) (analogizing legal decisionmaking to other craft traditions).
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expressed opinions of a policy’s effect will rarely deviate greatly from informed opinions about
the policy effect itself. This is especially true for run-of-the-mill administrative issues that elicit
little passion in the present, and can be thus be expected to attract virtually no attention when
retrospectively assessed in the future. There may be occasions when there is little need to
undertake the cost of a retrospective cost-benefit analysis, because there is widespread agreement
about what variable the agency should seek to optimize and there already exists a mechanism for
measuring that variable. Most policies, however, have numerous effects, and no objective
algorithm exists to convert all of them to a single scale. By averaging the costs and benefits that
different decisionmakers are expected to assign to various effects of a regulation, predictive costbenefit analysis avoids the subjectivity associated with ex ante determination of how to weigh
different variables in assessing the regulation. In practice, a policymaking process that uses
predictive cost-benefit analysis may be less prone to subjective influences than one that uses
positive information markets.
The most significant advantages of predictive cost-benefit analysis over positive
information markets, however, are technical. First, with predictive cost-benefit analysis, there is
less of a danger that the demographics of traders will have a significant influence on the market
outcome. Traders’ ideologies are more likely to affect trading behavior when the proper
valuation depends on ideologically contested assumptions. The task of predicting individuals’
preferences, however, is not necessarily ideologically charged, even if the preferences
themselves are largely ideological.265 Liberal and conservative traders might have different views
about the magnitude of costs that a proposed regulation will impose on businesses, but they
might nonetheless largely agree on how decisionmakers on average would assess those costs.
Methodologies for measuring and predicting public opinion may be controversial, but such
controversies tend to become ideological only in debates in which opponents each seek to claim
public approval. Predictive cost-benefit analysis does not solve the problem of ideological
influence entirely; traders may wrongly assume that others will agree with their own views,266
and they may believe that the passage of time will prove their perspective correct to the
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See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
See supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing the false consensus effect)
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retrospective evaluator. It lessens the problem considerably, however, and the effect seems likely
to be quite small as long as there is some ideological diversity among the traders.
Second, predictive cost-benefit analysis reduces the danger of spurious interpretations of
effectively random phenomena. Conditional markets require a comparison of two closely related
securities, so any noise in price determinations that randomly affects the two securities
differently may be misinterpreted as reflecting the market’s consensus about the effect of the
relevant condition.267 Predictive cost-benefit analysis requires the issuance of only one security,
so noise should not be a factor. Even if such analysis proceeded with two securities, one to
measure costs and the other to measure benefits, there is no overlap between what the two
securities measure, so the price difference is meaningful. There will be some instances, of
course, in which the evaluation of a regulation is so close that whether predictive or traditional
cost-benefit analysis anticipates slight net benefits or slight net costs is essentially random. 268
With conditional markets, however, noise may be of comparable magnitude to the effect of
interest, rather than just a small factor that may on occasion prove to be the decisive difference.
Third, predictive cost-benefit analysis avoids the selection bias problem, even if agency
decisionmakers have information unavailable to traders. A conditional market tends to
exaggerate the effect of the relevant condition because traders will reason that if the agency in
fact adopts the policy, it may have information indicating that the policy will in fact be
successful.269 This effect can occur only on a security that will have value only contingent on the
government decision. With predictive cost-benefit analysis, whether the policy is adopted does
not affect whether the retrospective assessment will occur, so selection bias is eliminated.
Traders’ assessments might still depend slightly on their estimate of the probability of adoption
should they believe that retrospective cost-benefit analyses will be kinder to a regulation that is
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See supra text accompanying note 77.
The policy decision is not necessarily unimportant in such cases. There may turn out to be very large net benefits or costs
even if the average decisionmaker’s evaluation would be very close to zero. When net benefits or costs are close to zero,
however, there is little significance in whether there are a few dollars of net benefits or of net costs, because in such cases the
probability that the regulation should be enacted will be close to 50% either way. As an analogy, many the outcome of the 2000
Presidential election might be seen as essentially random, in that very slight changes in conditions such as advertising
expenditures could have made either candidate the clear winner. Though the decision itself is of obvious importance, in advance
of an election, it may be far more important to ensure that election processes and machinery produce the “correct” winner when
the population is split 75%-25% than when it is split 50.01%-49.99%, since in the latter case the outcome is essentially a tie. Cf.
JAMES W. CEASAR & ANDREW E. BUSCH, THE PERFECT TIE (2001) (providing political scientists’ perspectives on the 2001
election).
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See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
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adopted than one that is not, all else being equal.270 Such an effect would make the government
seem modestly wiser than the traders’ views warrant and prevent predictive cost-benefit analysis
from being entirely independent of the present administration. Predictions, however, would still
be of retrospective cost-benefit analyses, and predictive cost-benefit analysis would still be far
less dependent on the identity of current agency decisionmakers than cost-benefit analysis of the
more traditional sort.
2. Predictive vs. Traditional Cost-Benefit Analysis
The principal disadvantage of predictive cost-benefit analysis relative to traditional costbenefit analysis is the cost of the procedure itself. Predictive cost-benefit analysis may well be
more expensive than traditional cost-benefit analysis, because the government must both
subsidize the information market itself and then, at least in some cases,271 pay for a retrospective
cost-benefit analysis. Theoretically, however, this balance is indeterminate, for at least three
reasons. First, the total cost will depend on how often retrospective analysis turns out to be
necessary. Second, the retrospective component of predictive cost-benefit analysis might be
cheaper or more expensive than prospective analysis. 272 Third, and most importantly, the
government can choose the level of market subsidization. Should the government invest little in
a predictive cost-benefit analysis, then predictive cost-benefit analysis might be cheaper than
traditional cost-benefit analysis. Of course, the government can decide how much to invest in
traditional cost-benefit analysis as well, with greater resources improving the report’s accuracy
and reliability.273
An analysis of both the cost and accuracy of the two forms of cost-benefit analysis thus
depends on the respective levels of funding. Presumably, at some level of funding, predictive
cost-benefit analysis will be as thoughtful as a typical traditional cost-benefit analysis. If enough
270

This might be true if the retrospective decisionmakers are prone to a status quo bias. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Status
Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 625-30 (1998) (discussing experimental evidence of such a bias).
A status quo bias, of course, also affects other political decisionmaking, and information markets should not make the effects of
such a bias any more severe than they already are.
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It would not need to do so when there are no transactions in the second phase of a two-phase information market. See supra
text accompanying note 251.
272
It might be cheaper if the policy is adopted and costs and benefits become easily ascertainable. On the other hand, it might be
more expensive for two reasons. First, actual measurement may be more costly than speculation, depending on how carefully
each is done. Second, when the policy is not adopted, it may be more complex to imagine a counterfactual world than it would
have been to imagine a possible future world.
273
By “reliability,” I mean the extent to which different practitioners of cost-benefit analysis would reach the same result.
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money is at stake, each predictor will have an incentive to spend as much time considering every
line item in the cost-benefit calculation as carefully as a traditional practitioner would. That level
of funding may not be necessary to achieve comparable accuracy; even if each individual
predictor has less knowledge than the practitioner of traditional cost-benefit analysis, the
collective prediction that emerges may be equally accurate. Determination of the precise amount
of funding needed to achieve comparable accuracy requires empirical evaluation, but the amount
may well be greater than that for traditional cost-benefit analysis because of the redundancy
associated with multiple traders’ studying the same information. 274 Concerns about the
implementation cost of the analysis itself are already important to debates about traditional costbenefit analysis, as executive orders require cost-benefit analysis only for sufficiently important
regulations.275 Predictive cost-benefit analysis may magnify those concerns.276
A comprehensive assessment would provide a cost-benefit analysis of the forms of costbenefit analysis. A numerical comparison of costs and benefits, however, is not yet possible, and
the above analysis suggests that the benefits may a function of the costs. To focus the analysis on
the benefit of predictive cost-benefit analysis, assume that it is funded at a sufficient level so that
it is as accurate as a typical traditional cost-benefit analysis, and retain the assumption that
predictive cost-benefit analysis is objective. Predictive cost-benefit analysis’s benefit with these
assumptions is that the signal it provides depends less on the identity of the current agency
officials. The superiority of predictive cost-benefit analysis along this dimension does not
necessarily mean that this improvement is worth the expense, or that predictive cost-benefit
analysis is sufficiently better than traditional cost-benefit analysis to justify greater reliance upon
it in the regulatory process. Nor is this advantage necessarily sufficient to overcome what can be
a healthy governmental reluctance to discard the procedures that it has traditionally employed.
These are critical issues, but my ambition is only to explain the significance of predictive costbenefit analysis’s production of a signal that is relatively independent of agency officials’ policy
preferences.
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Similar costs of redundant evaluation have long been recognized in the context of traditional securities markets. See Jack
Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561, 563-67
(1971).
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President Reagan’s original executive order required regulatory impact analyses only for “major rules.” 46 Fed. Reg 13193
(1981).
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Relatedly, if predictive cost-benefit analysis is expensive, it may magnify concerns about administrative ossification. See
McGarity, supra note 222.
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The defenses of cost-benefit analysis generally described above

277

provide a

straightforward preliminary explanation of why a tool that makes cost-benefit analysis relatively
more ideologically neutral represents an improvement. To allow for a clean comparison, consider
two extremes, which we may call purely ideological and purely objective means of conducting
cost-benefit analysis. With purely ideological cost-benefit analysis, agency officials do not
consider the underlying merits at all, except insofar as the merits are their actual ideological
concerns. With purely objective cost-benefit analysis, agency officials’ ideological preferences
have no effects on the outcome of the cost-benefit analysis. Sunstein should prefer the purely
objective approach, both because it thwarts heuristics to the extent that those heuristics have
become impounded into agency decisionmakers’ ideology, 278 and because it eliminates the
possibility that agency officials will exploit heuristics of members of the public to achieve
ideological ends. Eric Posner should prefer it as well, because a purely ideological cost-benefit
analysis would have no credibility with the President, Congress, and the courts, and it would thus
fail to reduce the skepticism about agency motives that he identifies as limiting agency action. Of
course, predictive and cost-benefit analysis do not represent these extremes, but the examples
reveal that cost-benefit analysis will be more effective, the less its results confound the ideology
of its practitioners.
This conclusion should be no surprise. To the extent that the results of cost-benefit
analysis represent anything other than the merits or how people on average will view the merits,
it becomes a noisier and less valuable measure. If a computer randomly added variance to costbenefit measurements, the new measure would be less useful than the old one. Ideological
perspectives and idiosyncratic views are not random, of course, but confounding cost-benefit
measures with these factors is even worse. The regulatory system does not need an indication
that agency officials favor a particular regulation; that is obvious from the agency’s decision to
277

See supra Part II.A.1.
Sunstein seems to assume that heuristics affect agency decisionmakers as much as the public. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 117,
at 9 (suggesting that cost-benefit analysis helps prevent agency decisionmakers from acting like “intuitive toxicologists”). But see
Michael Abramowicz, Toward a Jurisprudence of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1708, 1716 (2002) (reviewing
SUNSTEIN, supra note 117) (arguing that well-informed decisionmakers are likely to be relatively unaffected by heuristics, but
that they might seek to take advantage of the heuristics of others). To the extent that heuristics do affect such decisionmakers,
they might not affect decisionmakers of all ideology equally. For example, liberals who are generally pro-environment might be
more susceptible to an availability cascade resulting from an environmental catastrophe, because even an exaggerated policy
response will generally be in the policy direction that they prefer. Similarly, conservatives who are generally pro-national
security might be more affected by an availability cascade resulting from a terrorist incident, because the incident confirms their
own fears.
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adopt it. More worrisome, agency officials have the greatest incentive to shade the results of
cost-benefit analysis in those cases in which others are least likely to share their views. Thus, to
the extent that predictive cost-benefit analysis isolates average assessments rather than particular
assessments, it improves the enterprise. To some critics of cost-benefit analysis, making costbenefit analysis more useful should count as a deplorable development, for the same reason that
an environmentalist might not welcome a new piece of heavy equipment that makes it easier to
pave over wetlands.279 This critique is beyond my scope here, as my ambition is to show only
that predictive cost-benefit analysis can be a better tool than traditional cost-benefit analysis, not
to defend more broadly the rise of cost-benefit analysis.
Predictive cost-benefit analysis, however, may facilitate a reform that would mute at least
some of the concerns that critics of cost-benefit analysis offer. The reform would be a loosening
of the rules and norms underlying the practice of cost-benefit analysis, 280 such as the
requirements of OMB Circular A-94, 281 leaving practitioners of cost-benefit analysis free to
make their own decisions about how to measure and discount costs and benefits. For example,
such a reform would permit practitioners to count distributional effects of governmental
regulations explicitly as benefits or costs, rather than merely discussing such effects, as Circular
A-94 requires,282 effectively making the controversial Kaldor-Hicks criterion283 the lodestar of
279

Alternatively, cost-benefit analysis could be irrelevant to agency decisions, in which case a superior approach to cost-benefit
analysis accomplishes nothing. Matthew Adler and Eric Posner make this point:
Suppose, for example, that the public has no influence on political decision making and that all regulations are
approved if and only if interest groups that benefit from them have more political power than interest groups that are
harmed by them. Under these circumstances, it is hard to imagine a normative argument in favor of using cost-benefit
analysis. The results of cost- benefit analysis performed by agencies would not influence their choice of regulations,
and it hard to see why any political actors would want agencies to use cost-benefit analysis in the first place.
Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives—Introduction, 29
J. LEGAL STUD. 837, 839-40 (2000).
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Some agencies develop their own guidelines for cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g., U.S. EPA INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES &
ECONOMICS GROUP, OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING & STANDARDS, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSES FOR THE PARTICULATE
MATTER AND OZONE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS AND PROPOSED REGIONAL HAZE RULE 12-43 (1997)
(describing methodologies for calculating willingness to pay).
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See CIRCULAR A-94, supra note 123. The Circular could provide far more detailed guidance than it does, and much of the text
consists of statements that are relatively uncontroversial. See, e.g., id. ¶ 7.a (“Economic analyses are often most readily
accomplished using real or constant-dollar values, i.e., by measuring benefits and costs in units of stable purchasing power.”).
Other requirements, however, appear to be attempts to standardize administrative practice through choices with which some
reasonable people might disagree. See, e.g., Revesz, supra note 29, at 978 (suggesting that the Circular’s approach to discount
rates “can produce perverse results”).
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The Circular provides:
The principle of maximizing net present value of benefits is based on the premise that gainers could fully compensate
the losers and still be better off. The presence or absence of such compensation should be indicated in the analysis.
When benefits and costs have significant distributional effects, these effects should be analyzed and discussed, along
with the analysis of net present value.
CIRCULAR A-94 ¶ 10.
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cost-benefit analysis if not of regulatory policy more generally.284 Similarly, practitioners might
choose whether to measure deaths by the total number of lives lost or the total number of lifeyears,285 rather than having that choice dictated by a general policy.
It may at first seem perplexing why allowing such flexibility should be considered a
reform given the preceding analysis. After all, guidelines constraining the practice of cost-benefit
analysis seek to limit the danger that agency officials will view cost-benefit analysis as a hurdle
to their regulatory goals and will thus choose whatever parameters justify their ideological
conclusions. In addition, guidelines seek to assure that different agencies act consistently in
performing cost-benefit analysis,286 thus seeking to create some coherence in a regulatory regime
that critics have complained lacks rational inter-agency priority setting. 287 Guidelines thus
advance the same goal as predictive cost-benefit analysis, reducing the extent to which costbenefit analysis results depend on the identity of those performing the analysis. That is precisely,
however, why predictive cost-benefit analysis can allow for relaxation of standards. To the
extent that predictive cost-benefit analysis succeeds in divorcing conclusions from the identity of
particular agency decisionmakers, guidelines constraining the practice of cost-benefit analysis
are less necessary. Flexibility in the retrospective cost-benefit analysis that would survive in a
predictive regime does not present the same danger as flexibility in traditional cost-benefit
analysis. Because the retrospective decisions do not directly affect policy, predictive cost-benefit
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For a critique of the Kaldor-Hicks approach, see Jules Coleman, The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical
Review of Richard Posner’s The Economics of Justice, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1106-12 (1982).
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The existence of regulatory effects that cost-benefit analysis does not consider has led some proponents of cost-benefit
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consideration of “quality-adjusted life years”); Tammy O. Tengs et al., Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their CostEffectiveness, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 369 (1995) (recommending independently discounting each year of life saved); Richard
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analysis would result in predictions about how average decisionmakers would resolve any issues
for which the retrospective decisionmakers will have discretion.
That predictive cost-benefit analysis provides a mechanism that substitutes for the effect
of guidelines explains only why the loss of guidelines need not be mourned. There are sound
reasons, however, that the elimination of guidelines should be celebrated once the need for
constraint disappears. The guidelines are not neutral; rather, they necessarily impound value
choices. The guideline against factoring distributional effects directly into cost-benefit analysis
may well be sensible in existing practice, given the semantic awkwardness of calling a particular
redistributive effect a “cost” or a “benefit.”288 Perhaps the omission of distributional effects even
makes cost-benefit analysis seem more value neutral than under a hypothetical set of rules
indicating that monetary effects on the wealthy should count only at some prespecified fraction
as those on the poor.289 But any appearance of value neutrality from the omission of such rules is
an illusion. More generally, whenever the rules of cost-benefit prevent an effect of governmental
policy from being weighed in the balance, that decision carries a practical consequence, making
the omitted variable less important in the practice of cost-benefit analysis itself.
Predictive cost-benefit analysis would not eliminate debate of controversial
methodological issues, but it would allow the practice of cost-benefit analysis to continue
without unanimous resolution. Consider, for example, the recent debate about relative position
and cost-benefit analysis. Robert Frank and Cass Sunstein argued that by basing and costs and
benefits on individuals’ willingness to pay, cost-benefit analysis substantially undervalued
certain regulatory benefits.290 Individuals, they noted, care not only about their own economic
well-being, but also their position relative to those they know.291 Relative position matters more
for some goods, like sports cars, than for others, like health care,292 so an individual might be
favorable to a regulation mandating a benefit for everyone even if the amount of income workers
will lose as a result is greater than what individuals would be willing to pay in the absence of the
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regulation.293 Thomas Kniesner and W. Kip Viscusi offer a detailed response,294 arguing in part
that Frank and Sunstein overestimate the importance of relative position.295 Equally importantly,
they argue that factoring relative position into cost-benefit analysis is not practicable, given the
methodological difficulties in assessing how much relative position matters.296 They accordingly
reject the incorporation of positional concerns and conclude that “the most important refinements
one could make in the area of regulatory evaluation would be for agencies involved to adhere
more to the framework of what is generally considered a carefully done cost-benefit study.”297
A potential counter to Kniesner and Viscusi’s complaint about the methodological
difficulty of measuring the significance of positional effects is that the difficulty does not justify
a conclusion that the effects are zero. The government should attempt, this counterargument
suggests, to calculate the magnitude of positional effects as best it can, adjusting for different
contexts and different groups of workers to the extent possible. Perhaps anticipating this
counterargument, Kniesner and Viscusi argue that “the fact that the estimates are based on real
market data for life and death choices rather than hypothetical thought experiments is a major
contributing factor” to the acceptance of cost-benefit analysis. 298 Although omission of a
consideration from cost-benefit analysis as a practical matter constitutes a value judgment, the
observation might be correct as a matter of public relations. Nuanced attempts by agencies to
account for subtleties might make the value-laden nature of cost-benefit analysis more glaring.299
293
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Id. at 12-15. For example, Kniesner and Viscusi offer the following critique:
[S]uppose we consider the effects of others' incomes on my behavior, and my true reference group is only my neighbor
living in the house to the east. The researcher cannot know that only the income of one neighbor enters my decisions.
Therefore, a statistical model incorrectly identifying all the houses on my block as my reference group will find that the
average income on my block is statistically significant to my behavior because incomes are positively correlated across
houses nearby.
Id. at 15 (footnotes omitted).
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Id. at 2; see also id. at 19-22.
298
Id. at 23. They continue: “Moreover, given the sensitivity of the concerns [associated with the valuation of statistical lives], it
is noteworthy that implicit value of life estimates derive from the value workers themselves place on risks of death as reflected in
their labor market decisions.” Id. at 23-24.
299
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KIP VISCUSI & JOSEPH E. ALDY, THE VALUE OF A STATISTICAL LIFE: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF MARKET ESTIMATES THROUGHOUT
THE WORLD 15-16 (NBER Working Paper No. 9487, Feb. 2003) (considering whether a statistical method used to measure the
value of life from wage data should apply the logarithm of wages). Perhaps Kniesner and Viscusi are skeptical of Frank and
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undermined by any techniques not focusing on revealed preferences. Although this distinction may have technical merit, it seems
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By omitting a variable, an agency can plausibly claim that it wishes to simplify the process of
cost-benefit analysis and avoid making value judgments on a case-by-case basis.
Predictive cost-benefit analysis, however, provides a means through which a factor like
positional effects can be considered without any ex ante agreement about the extent to which it
should be a factor. Traders would seek to anticipate the importance that an average
decisionmaker would attribute to positional effects, and an agency would not need to take a
position on the value of positional effects in advance. The anticipated hypothetical average
decisionmaker, of course, might not give positional effects precisely the weight that either camp
in the debate believes to be appropriate. Predictive cost-benefit analysis, though, appears to
satisfy the procedural concerns of both camps. First, it provides a mechanism by which
positional factors, and more broadly any factors that some decisionmakers are likely to consider
important in cost-benefit analysis, can be counted. If positional concerns receive less weight than
Frank and Sunstein recommend, that would be because traders anticipate that decisionmakers on
average would give these concerns less weight. Second, it avoids both giving agency officials an
additional parameter that they can use to obtain the results that they seek and the appearance
problem associated with such discretion. Kniesner and Viscusi could complain that predictive
cost-benefit analysis would heighten the regulatory community’s awareness of disagreement
about cost-benefit analysis and thus perhaps undermine support even for a form of it that effects
a compromise on such disagreements. Even if we find admissible arguments that we should hide
the public from the sausage factory in which policy is made, this argument is of a more tenuous
sort, suggesting that we should not improve the workings of the sausage factory lest the public
realize that it is sausage they are eating.
By leaving the technicalities of cost-benefit analysis to predictors and retrospective
decisionmakers, predictive cost-benefit analysis answers some broad critiques of cost-benefit
analysis. Lisa Heinzerling, for example, has criticized cost-benefit analysis and numerical
assessment of regulation more generally, 300 arguing that numbers tend to obscure regulatory
debates rather than elucidate them. 301 As Sunstein points out in response to a critique of a
unlikely that the public will tolerate some methodologies for calculating costs and benefits but not others, given the general lack
of public awareness of methodological issues.
300
Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981 (1998).
301
Heinzerling argues:
[S]ome, probably many, people will be fooled into believing that numerical estimates of risks, costs, and benefits are
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specific cost-benefit analysis that she offers in a separate article,302 Heinzerling has no principled
objection to considering costs and benefits in the abstract, but only to particular approaches that
agencies have taken to counting them under a false claim to scientific truth.303 Predictive costbenefit analysis creates an ongoing discussion, both among predictors and among retrospective
assessors, 304 about the appropriate measurement of costs and benefits. Predictive cost-benefit
analysis results in a final number, but this number will reflect a compromise among various
decisionmakers’ anticipated views, rather than serve as a pseudo-objective justification for
policy.
Predictive cost-benefit analysis also answers critiques that cost-benefit analysis focuses
excessively on narrowly economic values, to the exclusion of aesthetic and other significant
values.305 Proponents of cost-benefit analysis have developed techniques for considering such
values, such as contingent valuation, which relies on surveys to assess how much citizens would
pay to save a species or preserve a forest.306 Such surveys, however, are notoriously vulnerable to
framing effects, with the amount surveyed individuals indicate that they would pay to save a
forest bearing little relation to the size of the forest.307 Predictive cost-benefit analysis cannot
determine what value should be assigned to a species or a forest, but it can allow for
incorporation of such values into regulatory assessments without entrenching any particular
flawed methodology. Aesthetic, economic, and other values may seem incommensurate, but
agencies cannot avoid at least implicitly balancing different values in making decisions. 308
Predictive cost-benefit analysis provides a method for achieving such balancing without putting a
thumb or a value judgment on the scale.
impartial reflections of factual reality, in which case the likely result of increased reliance on quantification in setting
regulatory policy will be that the side that best obscures the value choices implicit in its numbers will prevail. This will
not produce more sensible regulation, but it will produce a more dishonest debate about regulation.
Id. at 2068.
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C. Comparative Benefit Analysis
Predictive cost-benefit analysis does not by itself, however, provide an escape from a
related criticism of cost-benefit analysis, that the monetization of life diminishes human
dignity. 309 This claim does not insist that cost-benefit analysis will produce poor policy
recommendations, but that the act of conducting a cost-benefit analysis itself may be debasing or
have negative consequences. Partly in response to such claims, economists have offered
alternatives to cost-benefit analysis. Risk-risk analysis, for example, compares the risks that a
policy reduces with those that the policy will create.310 This alternative, however, is of little use
in a context in which risk is not the central issue of concern. Suppose, for example, that the
Defense Department wishes to consider various alternative weapons systems. 311 The relevant
question in such a case is the extent to which different systems will advance national security
goals. While it is possible to imagine translating this problem into cost-benefit terms or risk-risk
terms, the conversion is awkward. Identifying the dollar benefits of an improvement to national
security is a difficult exercise. Predictive cost-benefit analysis could perform this exercise and
produce a compromise among what different people would believe, but the need to consider this
factor will require traders to expend resources and impose risk on them. Because the aggregate
defense budget is unlikely to depend on the recommendations of predictive cost-benefit analysis,
the conversion is moreover unnecessary. All that matters in practice is the relative effectiveness
of different weapons programs, not how improvements to national security should be valued in
dollar terms.
With some modification, however, predictive cost-benefit analysis can easily measure
comparative benefits without quantifying those benefits in dollar terms. Suppose that the
Defense Department wishes to assess hundreds of possible weapons programs and is willing to
spend some fixed sum to subsidize a predictive information market. To do so, the Department
would designate one weapons program, presumably a well understood one such as the program
309

See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 190-95 (1993).

310

For discussions of risk-risk analysis, see John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk-Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK
VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1, 1-41 (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener
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for building F-15 fighter jets, as the baseline program. It would then auction off the right to be
the initial predictor for each of the other weapons programs and run an information market as
before. After the market closed and the delay period of a decade or more has elapsed, the
government would then retrospectively assess each weapons program relative to the baseline.312
A program, for example, that provided twice the national security bang for the buck of the
baseline program would have a rating of 2.0, while one that provided only one tenth the bang for
the buck would have a rating of 0.1.313 The government would then divide the preset subsidy
among the information markets corresponding to the various weapons programs in proportion to
their ratings, and it would then further distribute the amount for each information market in
accordance with a market scoring rule.314
The approach easily could be adapted to any context in which the government must
engage in priority setting. In the environmental context, for example, the government could
consider the relative benefits of a number of different environmental programs, ranging from
Superfund to the Endangered Species Act, perhaps even scrutinizing individual manifestations of
such programs for individual sites or species. That would eliminate the need for contingent
valuation procedures to translate environmental benefits into dollars. The relevant question
instead would be how people do (or should) value different environmental goods, as well as what
the social cost that these goods impose. As with any form of information market, agency officials
and Congress might still ignore the predictive evaluations, assuming that no mechanism required
priority setting to follow such recommendations. Comparative benefit analysis, however,
provides a means for forward-looking analysis of priority setting, just as predictive cost-benefit
analysis offers forward-looking assessments of whether individual policies should be adopted.
IV. CONCLUSION

In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co,315 thenJustice Rehnquist’s separate opinion suggested that the National Highway Traffic Safety
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Administration’s about face on passive restraint policy should be allowed in part because the
change in policy was the result of a change in Presidential administrations.316 Rehnquist’s realist
approach may have been admirably candid, but critics insisted that although politics may affect
agency policy decisions, courts should not simply abdicate their review responsibilities when
confronting such decisionmaking.317 Despite Rehnquist’s view, courts do not yield to politics.
Instead, they seek in administrative law cases to ensure public participation, consistency of
regulations with statutory requirements, and careful consideration of policy decisions by agency
officials. Doctrine, however, renders judicial review relatively deferential. 318 Part of the
explanation for deference may be a Rehnquist-like theory of winner’s spoils. Yet more often
deference is justified by relative institutional competence,319 that is by a conclusion that agencies
make policy better than courts.
Agencies’ general superiority at policymaking need not leave courts without a role. If
doctrine grants courts too much deference, agencies may adopt policies that thwart congressional
intent or represent ideological agendas that most of the population would reject. On the other
hand, if it grants too little, then judges may do the same. The balance depends in part on the
effectiveness and the objectivity of the tools that courts use to assess agency action. The only
tool that courts currently use is plain old logic reasoning, as judges assess whether agencies have
offered responses to significant counterarguments 320 and whether agency interpretations are
consistent with statutory authority.321. Reasoning is a powerful tool but an inherently subjective
one, and while judges presumably seek to avoid writing opinions that appear disingenuous,322
reputation furnishes only a limited constraint. The extent of deference that doctrine affords
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agencies thus reflects the difficulty of monitoring judges and the danger of government by
judiciary.
To the extent that information markets provide for objective analysis, information
markets both provide decisionmakers an opportunity to avoid poor decisions and offer others a
metric by which to assess the decisions that are made.323 Information markets serve these two
purposes both for agencies and courts. Just as an information market can help an agency avoid a
decision based on a poor prediction, so too can it help courts avoid their own errors. An
information market might lead judges to uphold policies that they would have struck down based
on their own normative lights, or to strike down agency actions that they otherwise would have
found to be within agencies’ broad discretion. Equally importantly, just as an information market
can allow courts and other governmental actors to assess agency officials, so too can such a
market allow for scrutiny of judicial decisions. Although no court would be expected blindly to
follow information market predictions and recommendations, 324 information markets could make
ideologically driven judicial reasoning more apparent, leading judges who care about their
reputations for neutrality to hesitate before acting on their own political views. 325 Used
judiciously, information markets thus have the potential to improve the incentives and decisions
both of agencies and of the courts reviewing them.
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